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I.

INTRODUCTION

Market power is often said to be central to antitrust analysis.'
Conceptually, this makes sense, of course. Without market power, a
seller cannot impose anticompetitive terms and therefore need not be
kept in check by the antitrust laws. 2 As a practical matter, though, the
focus on market power is not so obviously appropriate. The market
power inquiry is generally acknowledged to be one of the most difficult
and inconclusive in antitrust law,' and market definition, which is often a
I. See, e.g., George A. Hay, Market Power in Antitrust, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 807,
807 (1991) ("The concept of market power is at the core of antitrust."); William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937,
937 (1981) ("Market power is a key concept in antitrust law."). This Article focuses
particularly on section I of the Sherman Act cases brought under the rule of reason,
where market power is particularly important. See Chicago Prof! Sports Ltd.
Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Substantial
market power is an indispensable ingredient of every claim under the full [r]ule of
[r]eason."); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 79 ( 1994) ("Today most courts require a showing of
market power in cases alleging unlawful vertical restrictions or dealer terminations.").
"The term 'market power' refers to the ability of a firm (or a group of firms, acting
jointly) to raise price above the competitive level without losing so many sales so rapidly
that the price increase is unprofitable and must be rescinded." Landes & Posner, supra,
at 937.
2. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tux. L. REv. I, 20
(1984) ("Firms that lack power cannot injure competition no matter how hard they try.");
Hay, supra note I, at 808:
If we accept the notion that the point of antitrust is promoting consumer
welfare, then it is clear why the concept of market power plays such a
prominent role in antitrust analysis. If the structure of the market is such that
there is little potential for consumers to be harmed, we need not be especially
concerned with how firms behave because the presence of effective
competition will provide a powerful antidote to any effort to exploit
consumers.
Id.; see Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted
Distribution: Per se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 6, 16 (1981) [hereinafter Posner, Next
Step] ("[I]f a firm lacks market power, it cannot affect the price of its product; that price
is determined by the market.").
3. See Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1570 (I Ith Cir.
I 983) ("[M]arket power is not well suited to presentation in an adversary proceeding.");
Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982)
("Since market power can rarely be measured directly by the methods of litigation, it is
normally inferred from possession of a substantial percentage of the sales in a market
carefully defined in terms of both product and geography."); see also Frank H.
Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 GEO. L.J. 305, 312 (1987)
("Just as courts may err in thinking that a practice is harmful, so they may err in thinking
that a firm does not have market power.").
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prerequisite to the evaluation of market power, is similarly problematic.'
Therefore, although it is clear why market power plays a central role in
antitrust analysis, it is unclear why it should occupy a role so centralindeed, so often dispositive'-in antitrust litigation.
Under section 1 of the Sherman Act,' on which this Article will focus,
a central position for market power has been mandated neither by statute
nor by the Supreme Court. Section 1 refers only to "contract[s] ... in
restraint of trade,"' language that suggests no market power requirement.
Nor has the Supreme Court imposed any general market power
requirement under section 1. To be sure, the Court has imposed market
power requirements in certain categories of section 1 cases, but they are
only those cases in which the plaintiff proceeds under a per se theory.'
Indeed, the Court has on several occasions specifically rejected a market
power requirement in section 1 rule of reason cases.'
4.

Robert Pitofsky has emphasized this point:
Unfortunately. no aspect of antitrust enforcement has been handled nearly
as badly as market definition. This failure has resulted in part because of
persistent and unreconciled conflicts of approach in important judicial
opinions. It also reflects the fact that the critical issues in relevant market
definition-(!) what products are sufficiently close substitutes to compete
effectively in each other's market (definition of "relevant product market"); (2)
what firms are sufficiently proximate to others in spatial terms to compete
effectively (definition of "relevant geographic market"); and (3) what
substitute sources of supply can be diverted promptly and economically to
offer effective competition ("supply substitutability")-are all matters of
degree that are extremely difficult to measure.
Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1805, 1807 (1990) (footnote omitted). As the cases cited supra at note
3 point out, market share is frequently used as a proxy for market power, but market
share cannot be determined without first defining the market.
5. See Hay, supra note I, at 807 ("Operationally, assessing whether a firm or
firms have market power or any reasonable prospect for achieving it is often the first
(and sometimes, the only) step in performing an antitrust analysis.").
6. For discussions of the role of market power under section 2 of the Sherman
Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act, see infra Part H.B.
7. 15 U.S.C. § I (1994). Section I of the Sherman Act condemns "[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations .... " Id.
8. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464
(1992) (condemning tying arrangements); Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v.
Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 298 (1985) (excluding competitor from
joint venture); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13-16 (1984)
(condemning tying arrangement); see also Hay, supra note I, at 811-12 (discussing
requirements of market power in Jefferson Parish and Northwest Wholesale Stationers,
and noting that the Supreme Court did not require market power in rule of reason cases).
9. See FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460 (1986); NCAA v.
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The apparent ascendancy of market power under section 1 is thus a
phenomenon of the lower courts. More specifically, it is a rhetorical
triumph of Richard Posner and to a lesser extent Frank Easterbrook,
initially in their roles as professors at the University of Chicago Law
School and later as judges on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 10
The history of this triumph is somewhat disconcerting, in that some of
the leading Seventh Circuit cases supported their adoption of a market
power requirement by pointing to cases in other circuits that they said
had already adopted such a requirement, when those earlier cases had
not in fact done so." In this way, the current role of market power has
been built on a shaky foundation.
That role, moreover, is not nearly as significant as it often is said to
be. Despite occasional claims that most circuits have adopted a market
power requirement in rule of reason cases,12 only three-the Seventh,
Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109-IO (1984). Both Indiana Federation of Dentists and
NCM were horizontal cases, but the Court has seemed equally reluctant to adopt a
market power requirement in vertical cases. In Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), Justice White in concurrence argued strongly for the use of
such a requirement to distinguish vertical restraints that are subject to a per se rule from
those subject to the rule of reason. See id. at 70 (White, J., concurring). However, the
Court declined to adopt a market power test. The Court also could have adopted a
market power test in its discussions of rule of reason claims in tying cases, but it has
declined to do so. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 36 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
10. For examples of the academic advocacy of Posner and Easterbrook, see supra
note 2. As evidence of their judicial role, note that the Seventh Circuit provides eight of
the twenty-two cases cited by the ABA Section of Antitrust Law's Antitrust Law
Developments for the claim that "(c]ourts have generally held that proof of a defendant's
market power is an absolute prerequisite for a plaintiff seeking to use market analysis to
satisfy its burden of proving likely anticompetitive effect." 1 ABA SECTION OF
ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 60-61 n.313 (4th ed. 1997)
[hereinafter ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW]. None of the twenty-two cases is from
the Supreme Court. See id.
11. See infra Part IILC
12. See Appeal of Toys "R" Us, Inc. to the FTC (Public Record Version) at 49, In
re Toys "R" Us, Inc., Docket No. 9278 (Nov. 20, 1997) ("In vertical nonprice cases,
most courts of appeals have required a plaintiff to make a threshold showing that the
defendant imposing the restrictions had market power in order to establish the required
adverse effect on competition."); The Supreme Court, 1997 Term: Leading Cases, 112
HARV. L. REv. 122, 299 n.43 (1998) ("Indeed, in many circuits a showing of market
power or market share is a threshold requirement for rule of reason cases."); The
Supreme Court, 1983 Term: Leading Cases, 98 HARV. L. REv. 87, 260 (1984) ("The rule
of reason generally includes an analysis of both market power and procompetitive
justifications .... A showing of market power has normally been required because a
group of competitors without such power cannot impose a restraint that will harm
consumers.") (footnote omitted); see also Michael L. Denger & M. Sean Royall, Vertical
Price, Customer and Territorial Limitations, in 39TIJ ANNUAL ANTITRUST LAW
INSTITUTE 723, 797 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-1049,
1998):
To establish that the supplier imposing the restrictions has the market power to
bring about the required adverse effect on competition, courts have
increasingly required plaintiffs to make a threshold showing that the supplier's
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Fourth, and Eighth-ever did so unequivocally, and the Eighth has since
retreated. The other circuits that are said to have adopted a market
power requirement have actually drawn up short of that position in
various ways: by merely saying that adoption of a market power
requirement would be a good idea, without clearly adopting one;" by
stating they were adopting such a requirement, but only in cases that did
not turn on the issue;" or, most commonly, by emphasizing that in the
absence of market power anticompetitive effect is impossible, but not
explicitly requiring the plaintiff to prove power."
Of course, one could read any of these positions loosely as an
adoption of market power. To do so, however, would be to overlook the
fact that these courts could easily have adopted a market power
requirement clearly and explicitly. Instead, they have carefully avoided
doing so. The frequency with which courts have almost said that proof
of market power is required cannot be merely accidental; some other
factor must be at work. Perhaps courts find a failure to show market
power a convenient basis on which to dispose of weak cases. Or perhaps
the courts either would like to require market power or would like to
defer to other courts that do so, but are uncomfortable with actually
imposing such a requirement, particularly in the absence of Supreme
Court authority.
Part II of this Article describes the limited place of market power in
antitrust law as the Supreme Court has interpreted it. Part III describes
how market power has acquired a more expansive role in the lower
courts. The point of the section is not to diminish the legitimate role that
market power plays in antitrust law, but to suggest that the greater role it
now plays, or is said to play, is neither inevitable nor especially well
supported. Part IV surveys the use of a market power requirement in the
circuits, demonstrating that the requirement was and is more limited than
has often been said. Part V offers some comments on the theoretical
justifications that have been offered for a market power requirement, and
the Article concludes with some final observations.

market share (used as a proxy for market power) is sufficiently high that the
overall market could be impacted.

Id.
13.
14.
15.

See infra Part IV.C. (regarding the D.C. Circuit).
See infra Part IV.C. (regarding the Eleventh Circuit).
See infra Part IV.C. (regarding the Fifth Circuit).
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A.

THE MARKET POWER CONCEPT IN THE SUPREME COURT

Market Power in Section I of the Sherman Act Cases

Section 1 of the Sherman Act contains no reference at all to market
power, or even, more generally, to market structure; its prohibition of
any "contract, combination ... , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade" is
focused entirely on conduct. 16 Early on, though, the Supreme Court
determined that the language of section I is insufficient as a guide to its
enforcement. In Standard Oil Company v. United States," the Court
established reasonableness as the basic section 1 test," and in Board of
19
Trade v. United States it set out a number of factors to be considered in
applying this "rule of reason."'° Among those factors then, and in
subsequent guides to the rule of reason," were several related to market
power. 22
The Court, however, has never required that a plaintiff prove the
defendant's market power in a rule of reason case; market power has
been only one factor among many to be considered. Under section 1, the
Court has required proof of power only in two categories of per se cases,
those involving tying arrangements" and those involving exclusions of
24
competitors from joint ventures.
In per se cases, where actual
16. 15 u.s.c. § 1 (1994).
17. 221 U.S. I (1911).
18. See id. at 63-64.
19. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
20. The inquiry is all-encompassing:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as
may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the
court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the
nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
Id. at 238.
21. See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 527 (1948) ("In
determining what constitutes unreasonable restraint, we ... look ... to the percentage of
business controlled, the strength of the remaining competition, whether the action
springs from business requirements 01 purpose to monopolize, the probable development
of the industry, consumer demands, and other characteristics of the market.").
22. In the statement quoted in the preceding footnote, the reference to "the
percentage of business controlled," and perhaps also that to "the strength of the
remaining competition," point to factors that are usually considered important in
evaluating market power.
23. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13-14 (1984)
(stating that the Court has condemned tying arrangements per se "when the seller has
some special ability-usually called 'market power' -to force a purchaser to do
something that he would not do in a competitive market").
24. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.,
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anticompetitive effects need not be shown, a requirement of proof of
power makes sense. The proof of power, together with proof of a
particular sort of restraint, substitutes for the proof of anticompetitive
effect that is required under the rule of reason.
Furthermore, in the two per se contexts in which the Court has
required proof of market power, the nature of the power the Court
required was tailored to the nature of the case.25 The specificity of the
Court's use of market power is emphasized in Jefferson Parish Hospital
26
District No. 2 v. Hyde. After the Court required market power for the
application of the per se rule, its discussion of the defendant's liability
under the rule of reason did not mention market power in general or the
defendant's market share in particular, noting only that the plaintiff had
failed to meet its burden of "showing . . . actual adverse effect on
competition. " 21 This all suggests that to the extent the Court sees a role
for market power under section 1, that role is to be tailored to particular
sorts of cases, and perhaps only to per se cases, not applied as an
indiscriminate screen to all section 1 cases. 28
472 U.S. 284, 296 (1985) (considering whether the per se rule or the rule of reason was
the appropriate analysis for the expulsion of a member of a joint venture cooperative,
and concluding that the per se rule was inappropriate "[u]nless the cooperative possesses
market power or exclusive access to an element essential to effective competition").
25. In Jefferson Parish, the Coun offered this gloss on tying market power: "This
type of market power has sometimes been referred to as 'leverage.' ... '"Leverage" is
loosely defined here as a supplier's power to induce his customer for one product to buy
a second product from him that would not otherwise be purchased solely on the merit of
the second product."' Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14 n.20 (quoting 5 PHILLIP AREEDA
& DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND
THEIRAPPLICATION'f 1134a, at 202 (1980)).
In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, the per se test established by the Coun turned on
whether the "the cooperative possesses market power or exclusive access to an element
essential to effective competition." Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 296.
As Professor Hay has said, the latter part of this test-"'unique access to a business
element necessary to effective competition"'-seems to be a description of a particular
kind of market power. Hay, supra note I, at 812 (quoting Northwest Wholesale
Stationers, 472 U.S. at 298).
26. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
27. Id. at 31. The Coun pointed out that the relevant market could have involved
either the "market in which hospitals compete in offering services to patients"-that is,
the market relevant to its per se discussion-or the market for "competition among
anesthesiologists for exclusive contracts" with hospitals. Id. at 29.
28. Another indication that the Coun favors specific conceptions of market power
in its per se rules can be found in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S.
36 (I 977). In Sylvania, the Coun had an opponunity to rely on market power in
deciding when the per se rule would apply to nonprice venical restraints. The case
involved a location restriction imposed on its dealers by Sylvania, a television
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The Court's rule of reason cases also indicate that its confinement of
the market power requirement to per se cases is no accident. In two
cases in which the Court considered arguments that market power should
be required under the rule of reason, it rejected those arguments.29 In the
most recent of the cases, FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists,"' the
defendant argued that the FfC had failed to show market power." The
Court responded that a showing of market power was not necessary
when anticompetitive effects had been shown. The Court explained:
Since the purpose of the inquiries into market definition and market power is to
determine whether an arrangement has the potential for genuine adverse effects
on competition, "proof of actual detrimental effects, such as a reduction of
output," can obviate the need for an inquiry into market power, which is but a
"surrogate for detrimental effects."32

Both Indiana Federation of Dentists and NCM v. Board of Regents,"
the other case in which the Court rejected a market power requirement,
were horizontal cases. The market power requirement is equally
important in vertical cases, however, so one might question whether the
Court's statements in its horizontal cases are more broadly relevant.
That is especially so in that vertical cases are generally thought to
manufacturer with a single-digit market share, and Justice White, relying primarily on
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. I (1958), said that "[i]n other
areas of antitrust law, this Court has not hesitated to base its rules of per se illegality in
part on the defendant's market power." Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 65 (White, J., concurring).
The Court, however, approached the case by asking, following its prescription from
Northern Pacific for application of the per se rule, whether the challenged restraint was
one that "because of [its] pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming
virtue [should be] conclusively presumed to be unreasonable." Id. at 50 (quoting
Northern Pac., 356 U.S. at 5). It answered that question not by reference to the
importance of market power, or by reference to Sylvania's very small market share, but
by reference to the variety of circumstances in which vertical restraints can be
procompetitive. See id. at 55.
29. Those who argue that the Court would support such a requirement often cite an
observation that the Court made in Sylvania: "[W]hen interbrand competition exists, as it
does among television manufacturers, it provides a significant check on the exploitation
of intrabrand market power because of the ability of consumers to substitute a different
brand of the same product." Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 52 n.19. There are three reasons,
however, why reading this statement as an endorsement of a market power requirement
would be incorrect. First, the Court made it only in a footnote defining interbrand
competition. Second, Sylvania did not involve an application of the rule of reason, but a
determination of whether the rule of reason or per se rule was the proper standard.
Third, and most important, the crucial question is not whether market power is important
in theory-it clearly is, as the Court's observation acknowledges-but whether proof of
it should be required in litigation-a question on which the Court's observation sheds no
light.
30. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
31. See id. at 460.
32. Id. at460-61 (quoting 7 PHILLIPE. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 'f 1511, at 429 (] 986)).
33. 468 U.S. 5 (1984).
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present less of a competitive danger than horizontal ones," so that using
market power to screen out vertical cases could be viewed as desirable.
But there is another way to look at the matter: the form of market power
present in horizontal cases-aggregation of market share-is much
easier to measure in litigation than market power in vertical cases, which
usually derives from product differentiation." Therefore, as a matter of
litigation accuracy and efficiency, it might be less sensible to use a
market power requirement in vertical cases. That possibility is in fact
consistent with the Supreme Court's limited uses of market power in per
se cases, where the forms of power on which the Court has relied have
been horizontal. 36
The Supreme Court's most recent opportunity to clarify the position of
market power came last term, in California Dental Ass'n v. FTC. 31 In
that case, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's use of a "quick look" to
condemn certain advertising restrictions imposed by the California
Dental Association." The Court indicated that because the restrictions
were not ones whose "great likelihood of anticompetitive effects [could]
easily be ascertained," 39 a fuller rule of reason analysis was necessary.
The Court, however, did not describe such an analysis in detail, or make
market power a required part of it, stating only that the degree of market
analysis required will differ with the nature of the restraint. 40
Justice Breyer's concurring opinion, in which three other justices
joined, was more explicit on the issue of market power. Justice Breyer
suggested that "a traditional application of the rule of reason" comprised
the following questions: "(1) What is the specific restraint at issue? (2)
34. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-55 (1977);
The Supreme Court, 1987 Term: Leading Cases, 102 HARV. L. REV. 143, 308 (1988)
("All vertical agreements, even beneficial ones, have horizontal effects, but, because the
anticompetitive danger is greater when direct competitors agree than when
noncompetitors agree, the Court [in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics
Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988)] properly advised lower courts to treat horizontal agreements
more suspiciously than vertical agreements.") (footnote omitted).
35. See Peter M. Gerhart, The "Competitive Advantages" Explanation for
Intrabrand Restraints: An Antitrust Analysis, 1981 DUKE L.J. 417, 441-43 (1981)
(describing how the relevant source of market power in vertical restraints is product
differentiation).
36. That is true not only in the joint venture context of Northwest Wholesale
Stationers, but also in the tying context, where the sort of coercive power on which the
Court has focused is generally a function of market share, not of product differentiation.
37. 119 s. Ct. 1604 (1999).
38. See id. at 1618.
39. Id. at 1613.
40. See id. at 1617.
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What are its likely anticompetitive effects? (3) Are there offsetting
procompetitive justifications? (4) Do the parties have sufficient market
power to make a difference?'"" The location of the market power
inquiry, last in this series of questions, suggests that Justice Breyer does
not see it as a threshold issue. More support for that reading is found in
his statement that he only "assume[d]" that the FrC was required under
the rule of reason to prove market power." Even more interesting is that
Justice Breyer does not adopt the Chicago School view that without
market power any restraint must be procompetitive, but instead appears
to assume that the restraint is anticompetitive and looks to market power
only to determine whether it is of a magnitude sufficient to implicate the
antitrust laws. 43
B.

The Place of Market Power in the Court's Antitrust Jurisprudence

The Court's use of market power in section 1 cases is consistent with
its role in the Court's other antitrust cases. In section 2 monopolization
cases, of course, the Court has required a showing of power. In United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 44 it set out the basic test under section 2,45 which
the Court said "has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power
in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of
that power as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.'"'6 But the Court's reasons for requiring power under section 2
do not justify a similar requirement under section 1.47
41. Id. at 1618 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
42. Id. at 1621 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I shall
assume that the Commission must prove one additional circumstance, namely, that the
Association's restraints would likely have made a real difference in the marketplace.")
(citing AREEDA, supra note 32, at 376-77).
43. See id.
44. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
45. Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes illegal the acts of "[e]very person who
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
46. Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-71.
47. Indeed, one recent case has held the converse, that the Court's failure to
require power under section I means that it also should not be required under section 2.
The Sixth Circuit in Re/Max International, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995 (6th
Cir. 1999),petitionforcert.filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3138 (Aug. 17, 1999) (No. 99-294), said
that "[t]he Supreme Court has noted on at least two occasions that direct evidence of
monopoly power will support an antitrust claim." Id. at 1019. The two cases the court
cited as standing for the proposition that proof of effects is sufficient were Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992), and Indiana
Federation of Dentists, both of which the court acknowledged supported the proposition
only in the section I context, but the court said that it saw "no reason to believe that

10
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The Court's section 2 opinions do not indicate that it believes that
possession of market power is necessary for an act to be anticompetitive.
The offense of monopolization can be proven for a trade practice
imposed by a seller that does not initially possess market power. This is
because the willful acquisition of monopoly power is a section 2
violation. Mergers to monopoly are the obvious example," but there are
other acquisitions of monopoly power that resemble those section 1
violations that are usually evaluated under the rule of reason. For
example, a seller that enters into an exclusive arrangement with a
supplier can foreclose its competitors from access to the supplier and
thus gain monopoly power (if access to the supplier is important)."
Additionally, misleading customers in certain ways has been found to
constitute monopolization. 50 In neither of these circumstances does the
seller need monopoly power, or market power, to accomplish its
anticompetitive goal.' 1
monopoly power in the [section] I context is any different from the [section] 2 monopoly
power the plaintiffs allege here." Id. at 1019.
48. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I (1911); United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
49. This is the conduct alleged in the recent FfC complaint against Mylan
Laboratories, Inc.:
Mylan acted with a specific intent to monopolize, and to destroy competition
in, the generic lorazepam tablets market. Mylan devised and implemented a
calculated campaign to raise the price and profitability of lorazepam by
Jocking up the supply of lorazepam API, the most essential ingredient for
making generic lorazepam tablets.
Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief 'I 63, FfC v. Mylan
Laboratories, Inc., Case No. 1:98CV03114 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 1999), available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9902/mylanamencmp.htm>. It was also one of the forms
of conduct challenged in the Alcoa case. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,
148 F.2d 416,422 (2d Cir. 1945); see also 3A PHILLIPE. AREEDA & DoNALD F. TURNER,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 'f
768a, at 147 (1996) ("It is presumptively exclusionary for a monopolist to extract a
supplier's promise that ... [it] will not supply any of the monopolist's rivals-as, for
example, Alcoa did in its early years with its suppliers of electric power.").
50. See Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Resources Inc., 829 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir.
1987).
51. In the exclusive dealing example, the seller need only be willing to share the
resulting monopoly profits with its exclusive supplier. See Director of Investigation &
Research v. D&B Cos. of Canada Ltd., 64 C.P.R. 3d 216, 255 (1995) (observing, where
defendant had entered into exclusive arrangements to purchase scanner data from
retailers, that "the sole relevance of the market position of the retailers lies in their ability
to command a share of any monopoly returns that [the defendant] may be able to obtain"
and that "[t]he position of the retailers does not detract from [the defendant's] ability to
exercise any market power it may hold .... "). Where the seller misleads customers,
even that is not necessary, because the deception, by increasing demand for the seller's
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One might object to this analysis on the ground that the Supreme
Court requires power to establish an attempt to monopolize, which might
be interpreted to suggest that it believes power is necessary to acquire a
monopoly. Indeed, in Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 52 where the
Court required a dangerous probability of success in attempt cases, the
Court's primary concern appeared to be the difficulty of distinguishing
procompetitive from anticompetitive conduct," which might suggest that
the Court viewed market power as necessary for anticompetitive effect.
The Court did not, however, rely on a claim that anticompetitive conduct
is impossible without economic power." Instead, its concern was with
the particular problem of identifying anticompetitive unilateral activity,
and it adopted a market power requirement only in that particular
context. The Court explicitly distinguished unilateral action from
"concerted activity covered by [section] 1, which 'inherently is fraught
with anticompetitive risk,"'55 suggesting that no similar market power
requirement would be necessary in the section 1 context.
Even in the Court's Clayton Act merger cases, where the structural
focus would lead one to expect an emphasis on market power, the role of
power is limited. In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 56
which is still the Court's leading merger case, the Court said that the
"ultimate question under [section 7 is] whether the effect of the merger
'may be substantially to lessen competition' in the relevant market."" It
then established a role for market power, in the form of market share
measures, but not as a necessary element in proving the likelihood of a
lessening of competition. Instead, as in the per se context under section
I, the Court allowed proof of market power to substitute for proof of
product, creates its own market power. See Mark R. Patterson, Coercion, Deception,
and Other Demand-Increasing Practices in Antitrust Law, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. I, 16-20
(1997).
52. 506 U.S. 447 (1993).
53. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 244-45.
54. The Court did point out, though, that in Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v.
Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965), it had stated that it was
"necessary to appraise the exclusionary power of the illegal patent claim in terms of the
relevant market for the product involved" because '" [w]ithout a definition of that market
there is no way to measure [the defendant's] ability to lessen or destroy competition."'
Spectrum Spons, 506 U.S. at 456 (quoting Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177) (alteration
in original).
55. Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 459 (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-69 (1984)).
56. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
57. Id. at 362 (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 312 n.18
(1962)). Section 7 of the Clayton Act condemns acquisitions of stock or assets "where in
any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the
country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994). The significance of the Court's
omission of the monopoly language is unclear.
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likely competitive effect:
[W]e think that a merger which produces a finn controlling an undue percentage
share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the
concentration of finns in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen
competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence
clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive
effects."

In sum, the Court's cases dealing with section 2 of the Sherman Act
and section 7 of the Clayton Act echo two basic themes from its section
1 cases. First, the role of market power is tailored to particular
categories of cases; it is not applied indiscriminately as a determinant of
anticompetitive effect. Thus, the forms of power that are at issue in
tying cases and cases of exclusions from joint ventures are specific to the
competitive problems presented in those cases. In addition, power, or a
dangerous probability of monopolization, is used in attempted
monopolization cases because of the particular problems in evaluating
unilateral activity. Second, when the Court does establish a role for
proof of market power, it is often used as an alternative to evaluating
anticompetitive effect, rather than as an element in the proof of such
effect. In none of the Court's cases, under any of the antitrust statutes,
does it suggest that proof of market power is generally necessary to
establish proof of anticompetitive effect.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MARKET POWER REQUIREMENT

A.

Early Commentary

The first commentary advocating the use of market power in section I
rule of reason cases appeared in 1977. In its monograph of that year on
vertical restraints, the American Bar Association's Section on Antitrust
Law said that "[t]o determine the significance of the effects of an
intrabrand restraint on overall competition, the market power of the
product on which the intrabrand restriction has been placed must be
assessed."'9 Notably, this statement did not go so far as to require a
58. Philadelphia Nat'/ Bank, 374 U.S. at 363. The Court observed that "[s]uch a
test lightens the burden of proving illegality only with respect to mergers whose size
makes them inherently suspect in light of Congress'[s] design in [section] 7 to prevent
undue concentration." Id.
59. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MONOGRAPH No. 2, VERTICAL
RESTRICTIONS LIMITING INTRABRAND COMPETITION 62 ( 1977).
Richard Posner
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showing of market power; it only said that power should be "assessed."
To that extent, it was consistent with the expressed views of the
Supreme Court, which had included market power, or factors related to
it, among factors to be considered."'
On the other hand, the ABA monograph said that market power "must
be" assessed. In this, it went beyond the Supreme Court's statements, as
evidenced by its failure to cite any Supreme Court cases in support of its
assertion. Indeed, neither of the two lower-court cases that it cited
supports the statement. One, United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp.,"'
said only that the "portion of the market" is a factor in determining the
62
competitive effect of a restraint; although one could interpret this
statement to imply that all such factors must be examined, the case does
not go that far explicitly. The second case, Carter-Wallace, Inc. v.
United States,63 specifically stated that examination of market power can
64
be forgone.
The second, and more prominent, 1977 commentary on the market
power issue was then-Professor Richard Posner's article, The Rule of
Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania
Decision. In this article, Posner suggested an approach that "would
automatically preclude liability unless the manufacturer had a very large
market share or unless all or most of the manufacturers in the market
imposed uniform restrictions on their dealers so that (in either case) the
dealers had a monopoly position in a genuine economic market." 65 Thus,
Posner emphasized market share, but the share that he said is relevant
was that occupied by the challenged restriction, not the defendant.66
Later, he abandoned that approach and focused only on the share of the
67
defendant. In any event, in the 1977 article, he identified no Supreme
Court case in support of his view, citing only the circuit court opinion in

characterizes this monograph as "an exhaustive analysis of the evolution of restricted
distribution law to the eve of Sylvania." Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the
Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. l, 3 n.10
(1977) [hereinafter Posner, Economic Approach].
60. See supra text accompanying notes 17-22.
61. 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
62. Id. at 178.
63. 449 F.2d 1374 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
64. See id. at 1381.
65. Posner, Economic Approach, supra note 59, at 17.
66. This approach is similar to those of the National Association of Attorneys
General in its Vertical Restraint Guidelines, 49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 996
(Dec. 5, 1985), and of the European Commission in its recent revision of its approach to
vertical restraints, Communication from the Commission on the Application of the
Community Competition Rules to Vertical Restraints (Follow-Up to the Green Paper on
Vertical Restraints), 1998 O.J. (C 365) 3.
67. See infra text accompanying note 111.
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United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,68 a horizontal price-fixing
case. 69
B.

Posner's 1981 Article and the Pre-Valley Liquors Cases

In 1981, one year before he wrote the Seventh Circuit's opinion in
Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Ren.field Importers, Ltd., 70 which is discussed in
the next section of this Article, Professor Posner published a second
article addressing vertical restraints. 71 In the article, Posner said that
"[s]ome courts have narrowed the defendant's risk by requiring that the
plaintiff in a [r]ule of [r]eason case prove substantial market power in a
relevant market."" He cited seven cases in the footnote to this
statement." In fact, although two of these cases came close to doing so,
none clearly established market power as a requirement.
An
appreciation of how far the cases were from adequately supporting
Posner's statement requires that they be examined individually.
Four of the cases not only did not themselves require a showing of
market power, but made clear their views that proof of market power is
not required. One of these, Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,"
68. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), ajf'd as modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899)).
69. See Posner, Economic Approach, supra note 59, al 17 n.50 (citing Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 271). This citation may be reasonable in light of Posner's
exclusive focus on the harm of cartelization. The ''vastly superior" approach, Posner
opines, "is to focus on the single question whether the restriction is intended to cartelize
distribution or, on the contrary, to promote the manufacturer's own interests." Id. at 17.
70. 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982), later proceeding, 822 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1987).
71. See Posner, Next Step, supra note 2, at 6.
72. Id. at I 6. In contrast to Posner's earlier view that the relevant measure of
market power was that possessed by all sellers imposing the same restriction, see
supra text accompanying notes 65-69, the relevant power referred to by Posner in this
article is that possessed by the defendant. See Posner, Next Step, supra note 2, at 16 ("In
practice, this means that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has a large market
share-how large is unclear.").
73. See id. at 16 n.39. Most of the same cases are cited in the article on market
power that Posner co-authored the same year with William Landes. See Landes &
Posner, supra note 1, at 956 n.35 (citing Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 38889 (9th Cir. 1978); Northwest Power Prods., Inc. v. Omark Indus., Inc., 576 F.2d 83, 9091 (5th Cir. 1978); Oreck Cmp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 130 n.5 (2d Cir.
1978); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 562
(1st Cir. 1974)). In the Landes and Posner article, however, the authors also cited cases
taking the contrary position. See id. at 956 n.35 (citing Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of Am.,
622 F.2d 1068, 1081 (2d Cir. 1980); Harold Friedman Inc. v. Thorofare Markets Inc.,
587 F.2d 127, 143 (3d Cir. 1978)).
74. 575 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1978).

15

made only a general comment to this effect," but the other three
discussed the issue more specifically. Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp."
was most explicit." The court in Oreck noted that the plaintiff had not
shown that the defendant's share of the market was sufficient to allow an
anticompetitive interbrand effect, 78 which might on a quick reading
suggest that it found market power to be dispositive. But the court also
said that the challenged action-a manufacturer's elimination of one
dealer in favor of another-had not given the remaining dealer "a market
position from which it could raise retail prices even in the face of
interbrand competition."" That is, even with interbrand competition-a
lack of interbrand market power-the court was willing to consider the
possibility of presumably intrabrand anticompetitive effects.'°
Somewhat similar was Northwest Power Products, Inc. v. Omark
Industries, Inc.," which also involved the substitution of one dealer for
another. The court of appeals called "impeccably correct" the district
court's conclusion that in showing only this sort of substitution, the
plaintiff "had failed to produce facts which would demonstrate
anticompetitive effect."" But the appeals court then went on to examine
market power in order to distinguish the case from another in which "an
anticompetitive effect was said to exist when the new distributor, if
effective in driving out the old, would become a monopolist."" Thus,
the court was apparently willing to consider the attainment of intrabrand
market power as a violation in itself; whether the court would have been
willing to find liability on that basis is not clear, but its mention of
interbrand power in what seems to have been an afterthought is
•
84
suggest! ve.
75. "Increased concentration, as shown by a change in relative market shares, may
be an indicator, or a change in prices, output or quality which evinces market power may
be significant." Id. at 571 (emphasis added). This statement is consistent with the
Supreme Court's characterization of market share as a factor to be considered, rather
than a requirement. See supra text accompanying notes 17-22.
76. 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1978).
77. Other commentators have noted this, which makes Posner's citation of the case
peculiar.
78. See Oreck, 579 F.2d at 130 n.5.
79. Id.
80. This interpretation of Oreck is supported by a later Second Circuit case,
Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of America, 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980). In Eiberger, the
defendant argued that the plaintiff was required to show anticompetitive effect on the
interbrand market and that "an anticompetitive impact on intrabrand competition cannot
alone support a finding that [section] 1 has been violated," but the court rejected that
argument. Id. at 1081.
81. 576 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1978).
82. Id. at 90.
83. Id. (citing Cherokee Lab., Inc. v. Rotary Drilling Servs., Inc., 383 F.2d 97 (5th
Cir. 1967)).
84. At the end of the paragraph in which the court presents the analysis described
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H & B Equipment Co. v. International Harvester Co." was also
decided on the basis of the plaintiffs failure to show even intrabrand
effect. The court did not even use the term "market power," and it said
that under section I, proof of "[a]n unreasonably anticompetitive effect,
or conduct presumed under the per se rubric to have that effect, is all that
86
is required." It did point out that interbrand competition in the case
"appear[ed] to have been healthy,"" which might reasonably be taken to
have expressed the view that the defendant did not have interbrand
market power, but the court did not dispose of the case on that ground.
Instead, it focused on the fact that the defendant-manufacturer had
eliminated only one dealer among many," and the court made the point
that there were an adequate number of remaining dealers to preserve
9
sufficient intrabrand competition.' It is certainly true that if a plaintiff
fails even to show an anticompetitive intrabrand effect it should not
prevail, but that is so regardless of whether the defendant has interbrand
market power.
It is unclear how Judge Posner could have misread these cases to
require market power. One could perhaps read the latter three casesOreck, Northwest Power, and H&B Equipment-to require either
interbrand or intrabrand market power, but one cannot reasonably read
them to require interbrand market power. Posner's position is that
90
intrabrand power is not enough; in the statement quoted above, he
would not consider the intrabrand market a relevant antitrust market.
Another of the cases cited by Posner, George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc., v.
Paddock Pool Builders, Inc.,9' does not go as far as the four cases just
discussed, in that it does not explicitly state that market power is not
required in a rule of reason case, but it is most fairly read to suggest so.
The main issue in the case was whether the per se rule or rule of reason
in the text, the court states that Northwest Power, "like Cherokee Laboratories, Inc.,
entails interbrand as well as intrabrand competition." Id. at 90. This analysis makes
clear the point of the court's earlier statement that "[t]he market power of the defendant
charged with a Pick-Barth violation [i.e., the substitution of one dealer for another] is
crucial." Id. at 89. The defendants in Northwest Power included both the manufacturer
and the substituted dealer, and the court's view was that the power of each was
important.
85. 577 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1978).
86. Id. at 243.
87. Id. at 246.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
91. 508 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1974).
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was applicable." The court distinguished the two rules by noting the
greater importance of market power in the per se context. It said that "a
'rule of reason' analysis, involv[es], among other factors, a study of the
consequences of the conduct on the affected market. . . . On the other
hand, analysis of market power as opposed to effect is required for most
per se violations."93 As described above, this analysis is consistent with
the Supreme Court's requirements of market power in section 1 per se
cases; it does not, however, advocate the use of, let alone require, market
power in rule of reason cases.
The final two of the seven cases come close to supporting the point for
which Posner cites them. One of them, Gough v. Rossmoor Corp.,"
requires the plaintiff to define a relevant market in a rule of reason
case." Definition of the relevant market is usually a step in the
determination of market power, and later in the case the court's opinion
could be read to suggest such a requirement. 96 That suggestion comes,
however, in the court's section 2 discussion; the court does not include
or even suggest such a requirement in the section 1 portion of its
opinion." Moreover, the only support the court cites for its requirement
of market definition is a very general statement from Sylvania: "[A]n
antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would lack any
objective benchmarks."" From this statement, the court draws the
unobjectionable gloss that "[b]efore this study can even be commenced,
however, we must know with what field of competition we are
concerned and the dimensions of that field." 99 These very general
statements, together with the court's failure to explicitly require proof of
92. See id. at 559.
93. Id.
94. 585 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1978).
95. See id. at 389.
96. The court is hardly clear:
(N]o inference of intent to monopolize can be drawn from the anticompetitive
conduct in question unless it amounted to an unreasonable restraint of trade
under [section] I. While conduct which would, in the case of a conspiracy,
amount to a per se violation of [section] 1 would constitute an unreasonable
restraint of trade without proof of market or market power, under the rule of
reason market definition is required to establish a [section] 1 violation, as we
have previously noted. Thus, in the absence of proof of relevant market and
market power, the plaintiff must prove either predatory conduct or a per se
violation of [section] I to prove an attempt to monopolize.
Id. at 390.
97. See R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 827 F.2d 407, 1987
U.S. App. LEXIS 11681, at *20 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 1987) (describing as "dictum" the
statement in Gough v. Rossmoor Corp. that market power is a necessary element of a
rule of reason claim), opinion on rehearing en bane, 890 F.2d 139 (9th Cir. 1989).
98. Gough, 585 F.2d at 389, quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977).
99. Id.
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market power, suggest that the court's real concern was with the
plaintiffs failure to focus carefully on the nature of the market, not on
market power. To read the case as supporting a market power
requirement demands at the same time a close reading of the case to find
its mention of market power and a casual willingness to ignore the actual
basis of its decision.
The final case cited by Posner, which perhaps not coincidentally is the
only district court case, Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire
Corp.,1'"' came quite close to requiring proof of market power. What the
case explicitly said, however, was only that market power is necessary to
restrain competition.'°' One can accept that proposition, of course,
102
without believing that proof of market power is required.
But the
court did conclude that the defendant lacked power, and it appeared to
find that fact very important.'°' It then went on, however, to describe
04
why the plaintiffs claims were implausible on other grounds, ' thus
leading one to wonder whether an absence of market power alone would
have been sufficient.
In the end, it might be fair to say that Donald B. Rice, as Posner said,
"requir[ed] that the plaintiff in a [r]ule of [r]eason case prove substantial
market power in a relevant market."'°' It is inaccurate to say the same of
Gough, but that case at least seemed as if it would agree with such a
106
requirement.
The other five cases cited by Posner do not, however,
support his point. Indeed, they all would be better cited for the
proposition that proof of interbrand market power is not a requirement in
section I rule of reason cases. Nevertheless, Posner's article may have
laid the groundwork for such a requirement, as the next section shows.
C.

Valley Liquors

The earliest case that is commonly cited for the proposition that a
showing of market power is required is Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield
100. 483 F. Supp. 750 (D. Md. 1980).
101. See id. at 761 ("Only a firm with market power can effectively restrain
competition.").
102. See infra text accompanying notes 242-43.
103. See Donald B. Rice, 483 F. Supp. at 761.
104. See id. at 761-62.
105. Posner, Next Step, supra note 2, at 16.
106. Just how relevant to Posner's point that agreement would be, given that
Gough, like Whitten, was a horizontal case and not a vertical one, is not clear. See supra
text accompanying notes 35-36.
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0

Importers, Ltd. ' ' This case generated two opinions from the Seventh
Circuit, both of which treat the market power requirement as well
established. In the first opinion, Valley Liquors I,'°' Judge Posner said
that because weighing the effects of interbrand competition and
intrabrand competition was difficult, '09 courts have "looked for
shortcuts."110 He noted that "[a] popular one is to say that the balance
tips in the defendant's favor if the plaintiff fails to show that the
defendant has significant market power.""' He then adopted this same
approach for the Seventh Circuit. 111
One might expect, since this proposition is the same one that Professor
Posner supported only one year before by citing the cases discussed in
the previous section, that Judge Posner would have cited some of the
cases in Valley Liquors I. He did not. Instead, he said that requiring a
showing of market power was "the approach of the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits," and cited one case from each circuit."' The Ninth Circuit
case, Cowley v. Braden Industries, Inc.,"• does not impose any sort of
market power requirement on the plaintiff; the court simply says that
even with a showing of market power, the burden of showing that a
1
restraint is unreasonable remains on the plaintiff. "
116
The Fifth Circuit case, Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., also
did not impose a market power requirement. To be sure, Muenster
Butane said that market power is necessary for anticompetitive effectciting Posner's 1981 article11 '-but that is not the question."' The
question is whether we are willing to allow a jury to infer
anticompetitive effect from any other evidence, or if the plaintiff must
prove, at the outset, that the defendant has market power. Muenster
Butane was not willing to go that far-it said only that a market power
requirement "would have saved the litigants and the courts much
expense." 119 In fact, the court devoted most of its analysis to an

107. 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982), later proceeding, 822 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1987).
108. 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter Valley Liquors J]. The second
opinion is discussed infra text accompanying notes 135-40.
109. The need for such a weighing derived, he said, from a "suggestive footnote" in
Sylvania. Valley Liquors I, 678 F.2d at 745 (citing Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 n.27 (1977)).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See id.
113. Id.
114. 613 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1980).
115. See id. at 754-56.
116. 651 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981).
117. See id. at 298.
118. See infra text accompanying notes 242-43.
119. Muenster Butane, 651 F.2d at 298.
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evaluation of the competitive effects of the challenged restraints,
concluding not only that the defendant's actions reduced undesirable
120
"free-riding,"
but that "intrabrand competition . . . continued
121
unabated. "
In light of these conclusions, it is not surprising that the
court did not rely on a lack of market power.
Valley Liquors I, in contrast, did rely on the lack of market power. 122
Oddly, though, it did not say explicitly that it was doing so. Instead,
Posner made some academic-sounding comments about how, without
market power, "[e]ven if there is some possibility [of] ... a substantial
anticompetitive effect, it is too small a possibility to warrant trundling
out the great machinery of antitrust enforcement." 123 And, as quoted
above, it did not actually say that the approach it was adopting was to
impose a threshold market power requirement, but "to say that the
balance tips in the defendant's favor if the plaintiff fails to show ...
significant market power. " 124 This is a somewhat cryptic statement,
especially in light of Valley Liquors I's description of Muenster Butane
as having "held that the effects on intrabrand and on interbrand
competition must be balanced in deciding whether a challenged
restriction on distribution is umeasonable."'" That description is
accurate, but a balancing approach is inconsistent with a threshold
market power requirement.
A market power requirement was advocated more clearly, but only in
dictum, in other decisions, mostly from the Seventh Circuit, in the years
following Valley Liquors I, often with opinions written by Judge Posner.
For example, in General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing
Ass'n, 126 Judge Posner wrote that "some progress has been made toward
giving [the rule of reason] some structure by requiring that the plaintiff
120. Id. at 297.
I 21. Id. at 298.
122. See Valley Liquors I, 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982).
123. Id. The Supreme Court has disagreed:
A small participant in the market is, obviously, less likely to cause persistent
damage than a large participant. ... For reasons including market inertia and
information failures, however, a small conspirator may be able to impede
competition over some period of time. Given an appropriate set of
circumstances and some luck, the period can be long enough to inflict real
injury upon particular consumers or competitors.
FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 434-35 (1990) (footnote
omitted).
124. Valley Liquors I, 678 F.2d at 745.
125. Id.
126. 744 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1984).
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first prove that the defendant has sufficient market power to restrain
competition substantially."121 In support of this proposition, the decision
cited five cases. 128 In addition to Valley Liquors I and Muenster
Butane,1" the court cited Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Building,
130
131
Inc. and Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co. from the Seventh Circuit,
and Graphic Products Distributors, Inc. v. Itek Corp. 132 from the
1
Eleventh Circuit. "
Lektro-Vend did not discuss a market power
requirement, and although the other cases-General Leaseways, Jack
Walters & Sons, and Graphic Products--did refer to such a requirement,
in none of them was it necessary to the decision of the case. 134
The Seventh Circuit's first unequivocal holding that a plaintiff must
show market power in a rule of reason case came in Valley Liquors II,1"
three years after General Leaseways. The second opinion cited four
cases, in addition to Valley Liquors I and General Leaseways, in support
of its bald statement of the market-power requirement: "A threshold
inquiry in any [r]ule of [r]eason case is whether the defendant had
market power, that is, the 'power to raise prices significantly above the
competitive level without losing all of one's business."'136 Of those four
cases, three were Seventh Circuit decisions that did not in fact adopt a
market power requirement. 137 The other case, Assam Drug Co. v. Miller
127. Id. at 596.
128. See id. General Leaseways also cited Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical
Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 157-68 (1984). See
General Leaseways, 744 F.2d at 596.
129. Not among the citations was Cowley v. Braden Industries, Inc., 613 F.2d 751
(9th Cir. 1980), the Ninth Circuit case that Valley Liquors I incorrectly said adopted a
market power requirement. See Cowley, 613 F.2d at 755 (rejecting claims of a market
power requirement).
130. 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1984).
131. 660F.2d255 (7th Cir. 1981).
132. 7 I 7 F.2d 1560 (I Ith Cir. 1983).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 112-13.
134. The concurrence in Jack Walters & Sons pointed this out:
Unfortunately, I cannot concur in much of the discussion contained in the
majority opinion, not because that discussion may not state correct principles
of law, but because I believe it is dicta--<licta that might tend to influence and
prejudice decisions in cases yet unborn but which may come to this court for
review.
Jack Walters & Sons, 737 F.2d at 713 (Swygert, J., concurring).
135. 822 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Valley Liquors II].
136. Id. at 666 (quoting Valley Liquors I, 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982)).
137. See Hennessy Indus. Inc. v. FMC Corp., 779 F.2d 402, 404-05 (7th Cir. 1985);
Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 191 (7th Cir. 1985);
Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 265 (7th Cir. 1984). Actually,
far from supporting the court's point, these cases provide further examples of the
peculiarities in the rhetorical development of the market power requirement. First, Polk
Bros. cited Brunswick in support of this statement: 'The first step in any [r]ule of
[r]eason case is an assessment of market power." Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 191. Then,
Hennessy made the following statement: 'This court held in [Brunswick] that 'the first
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Brewing Co.,1" was from the Eighth Circuit, and, as discussed below, 139
Assam Drug did indeed adopt a market power requirement. It is
therefore the first case the Seventh Circuit cites from another circuit that
0
clearly does so, " and it is significant that when it became available, the
Seventh Circuit not only ceased including its earlier, more questionable
citations, but also-finally-explicitly adopted the requirement itself.
Here, then, are the steps in the development of the market power
requirement through Valley Liquors I and//:
1. Professor Posner writes an article claiming that "some courts"
have adopted a market power requirement, and cites seven cases.
In fact, only one of those cases, a district court case, is fairly
described as having adopted such a requirement, though one other
of the cases might perhaps have been willing to do so. Five of the
141
cases appear to disagree with the requirement.
2. Muenster Butane says that a market power requirement would be
appropriate (though it does not adopt one), citing only the
misleading Posner article. Muenster Butane does not cite any of
142
the cases cited in the Posner article.
3. In Valley Liquors I, Judge Posner says that a "popular" shortcut is
a market power requirement, citing two cases, one of which
step in any [r]ule of [r]eason case is an assessment of market power."' Hennessy, 779
F.2d at 404-05 (apparently quoting Brunswick). However, Brunswick did not hold, let
alone state, anything of the son. Brunswick (written by Judge Posner) was a section 2
case based on patent fraud, and though Brunswick said, as one would expect in that
context, that "[t]he patent must dominate a real market," Brunswick, 752 F.2d at 265,
that holding simply has nothing to do with the rule of reason under section I. In Polk
Bros. (written by Judge Easterbrook), there was also no rule of reason claim, the plaintiff
having proceeded only under the per se rule. Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 191. Hence, Judge
Easterbrook's comments on the rule of reason were dicta. Finally, although Hennessy
did involve a rule of reason claim, its comments on market power were not made in the
context of that claim. See Hennessy, 779 F.2d at 404. Instead, they were made in the
context of what the court called a "claim for a [r]ule of [r]eason violation under [s]ection
2." Id. Putting aside the fact that section 2 claims generally are not called "rule of
reason" claims, there is no question that market power-actually, monopoly power, or
the dangerous probability of it-must be proved under section 2. See supra text
accompanying notes 44-55. But that says nothing about the rule under section I.
138. 798 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1986).
I 39. See infra Part IV .B.
140. Subsequently, however, the Eighth Circuit retreated from its requirement of a
showing of market power, see infra Part IV.B, and a very recent Seventh Circuit case,
Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass 'n, 95 F.3d 593
(7th Cir. 1996), cited only other Seventh Circuit cases.
141. See supra Part III.B.
142. See supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
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imposes no such requirement and the other of which is Muenster
Butane. Despite having only two cases (and only one that comes
close to being a valid one) to cite for what he says is a popular
position, Posner does not cite any of the cases that he said in his
earlier article adopted that position. 143
4. Jack Walters & Sons from the Seventh Circuit and Graphic
Products from the Eleventh Circuit advocate a market power
requirement in dictum. General Leaseways then cites those two
cases in advocating the requirement in dictum. 144
5. Assam Drug adopts a market power requirement for the Eighth
Circuit, relying, as discussed below, on Posner's 1981 article and
a number of cases, none of which themselves clearly adopted such
a requirement. 145
6. Valley Liquors II cites five Seventh Circuit cases that do not
clearly adopt a market power requirement and Assam Drug in
adopting-for the first time in the Seventh Circuit-the market
•
146
power reqmrement.
The sequence of events is striking: the Seventh Circuit built support for
a market power requirement by questionable citations in early cases,
dropping those citations in favor of more valid ones as other cases came
closer to adopting the requirement, often relying on Seventh Circuit
precedent, until finally, after Assam Drug clearly adopted the
requirement, the Seventh Circuit did so as well.
IV. THE MARKET POWER REQUIREMENT IN THE CIRCUITS

In the years following Valley Liquors I, several other circuits adopted
or came close to adopting a market power requirement. Indeed, it has
been claimed that the requirement became a more or less general one:
"[i]n vertical nonprice cases, most courts of appeals have required a
plaintiff to make a threshold showing that the defendant imposing the
restrictions had market gower in order to establish the required adverse
effect on competition." 1 7 As will be seen below, however, the adoption
of the requirement has been far less general and far more equivocal than
143. See supra notes 107-25 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
145. See infra note 175.
146. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
147. Appeal of Toys "R" Us, Inc. to the FfC (Public Record Version) at 49, Docket
No. 9278 (Nov. 20, 1997) (citing Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215, 1231
(8th Cir. 1987); Ball Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1334
(7th Cir. 1986); Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1568 (11th
Cir.1983) ).
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is commonly believed, and even where such a requirement has been
adopted, the adoption generally has not been accompanied by careful
analysis.
In fact, the courts' adoptions of a market power requirement have not
always shown the expected respect for binding precedent. Despite the
Supreme Court's explicit rejection of the requirement in Indiana
Federation of Dentists,"' two circuits retain it. One could perhaps
imagine that a court would retain the requirement for vertical cases, but
reject it for horizontal ones, since Indiana Federation of Dentists was
horizontal (as was NCAA, which also rejected the requirement), and
vertical cases are generally viewed as presenting less danger to
competition. But Indiana Federation of Dentists applied its rule not
only to the rule of reason in horizontal cases, but also to the rule
generally, and it might have been appropriate to do so. 1' 9
In any event, the courts that have flouted Indiana Federation of
Dentists have not drawn on the distinction between horizontal and
vertical cases, nor has the antitrust commentary. For example, the ABA
Antitrust Section's Antitrust Law Developments said in 1997 that
"[c]ourts have generally held that proof of a defendant's market power is
an absolute prerequisite for a plaintiff seeking to use market analysis to
satisfy its burden of proving likely anticompetitive effect."1' 0 Perhaps
the restriction of this statement to plaintiffs "seeking to use market
analysis" is intended to suggest that the statement is confined only to
plaintiffs that do not show actual anticompetitive effects, thus
conforming to the views of the Supreme Court, but the statement makes
no distinction between horizontal and vertical cases.
The two circuits-the Seventh and Fourth-that have continued to
require market power despite the Supreme Court's rejection of such a
requirement are discussed in the first section below. The second section
discusses the two circuits-the Sixth and Eighth-that adopted a market
requirement in the wake of Valley Liquors I, but abandoned it after
Indiana Federation of Dentists. The third section describes how the
Fifth, District of Columbia, Eleventh, and Tenth Circuits have come
close to adopting a market power requirement, without quite doing so.
The fourth section discusses two circuits-the First and Ninth-that
flirted with a market power requirement in isolated early cases, but then
148.
149.
150.

See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 10, at 60.
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rejected it on their own. Finally, there are the Second and Third
Circuits, which never adopted a market power requirement. Indeed, in a
recent case the Third Circuit appeared to express an understanding of the
requirement as a broadening, rather than a narrowing, of potential
antitrust liability.
A.

Circuits that Have Adopted and Maintained a
Market Power Requirement

Of the two circuits that appear to have maintained a market power
requirement even in the face of the Supreme Court's rejection of such a
requirement, only one has explained why. Not surprisingly, that circuit
is the Seventh. In Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 1l 1 the Seventh
Circuit acknowledged that Indiana Federation of Dentists said that proof
of anticompetitive effects "can obviate the need for an inquiry into
market power,'' 152 and it said that the Wilk district court's "findings
eliminated the need for an inquiry into market power." 153 The court also
said, however, consistent with earlier Seventh Circuit decisions, that
"[t]he threshold issue in any rule of reason case is market power." 154 The
Seventh Circuit has recently reaffirmed that position. 1ll
The Wilk court apparently felt that it could reconcile the Supreme
Court's views with its own in this statement: "The district court also
relied on substantial evidence of adverse effects on competition caused
by the boycott to establish the [defendant's] market power." 156 In other
words, if the plaintiff offers proof of actual detrimental effects, that
proof is also proof of market power, and thus meets the threshold market
power requirement. But this eliminates any independent role for market
power, because independent proof of market power is not necessary. 1"
151. 895 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1990).
152. Id. at 360 (quoting FfC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61
(1986)).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 359.
155. "Substantial market power is an indispensable ingredient of every claim under
the full [r]ule of [r]eason." Chicago Prof! Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball
Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593,600 (7th Cir. 1996).
156. Wilks, 895 F.2d at 360.
157. This can present a problem, of course, if the effects at issue are not clearly
anticompetitive. Consider a recent Australian case, Me/way Publishing Pty. Ltd. v
Rohen Hicks Pty. Ltd., No. VG 638 of 1998 (Aust!. Fed. Ct., Viet. Dist. Registry May
20, 1999) (LEXIS, Aust. Library FCUNR File), in which the court considered a statute
providing that "[a] corporation that has a substantial degree of power in a market shall
not take advantage of that power for the purpose of ... deterring or preventing a person
from engaging in competitive conduct in that or any other market." Id. The defendant, a
monopolist, had withheld its goods from a former dealer, thus preventing it from
competing, so the only question was whether it had "take[n] advantage of' its power.
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For the court then to continue to insist that proof of market power is a
threshold requirement is disingenuous, and seems calculated more to
mislead than to guide litigants.
Although the Fourth Circuit has also affirmed a market power
requirement since Indiana Federation of Dentists, it has made no
attempt to reconcile its requirement with the Supreme Court's
statements. Oddly, the Fourth Circuit did not even adopt such a
requirement until after Indiana Federation of Dentists."' First, in
159
Military Services Realty, Inc. v. Realty Consultants of Virginia, Ltd., it
said that "[i]n proving a [s]ection 1 violation, the plaintiff must show the
market shares of the competitors in the relevant market."'"' This seems
to require only that the shares of the defendant be put before the court,
not that the defendant be proven to have a large share. The following
sentence supports this interpretation: "Facts must be presented to the
court to enable it to ascertain the market power of the defendant both
before and after the alleged anti-competitive conduct."161 But
subsequently, in Murrow Furniture Galleries, Inc. v. Thomasville
Furniture Industries, Inc., 162 the Fourth Circuit said that "[a] threshold
inquiry in any [r]ule of [r]eason case is whether the defendant had
market power."'"
See id. Two of the three judges concluded that it had, because, they said, if the
defendant had not been a monopolist, it would not have withheld the goods and allowed
competitors to supply them. See id. The problem here is that it is not clear that the
prevention of the dealer from entering the market, which was an intrabrand restraint, was
in fact anticompetitive. If it was not, then the inference that market power was the
source of that conduct would not necessarily be accurate.
This, of course, is the basic motivation for an independent market power requirement.
The problem in Me/way, though, was that the statute at issue did not forbid
anticompetitive conduct, but forbade "preventing a person from engaging in competitive
conduct in that or any other market," which, if that other market was an intrabrand one,
might not be anticompetitive. Id. The rule of reason under section I of the Sherman Act
forbids only anticompetitive conduct, so that a finding of anticompetitive conduct
implies market power.
158. However, a district court decision from the Fourth Circuit adopted a market
power requirement even before Valley Liquors I. See supra text accompanying notes
100-04.

159. 823 F.2d 829 (4th Cir. 1987).
160. Id. at 832 (citing Northwest Power Co. v. Omark Indus., 576 F.2d 83, 89 (5th
Cir. 1978)).
161. Id. (citing Havoco of Am., LTD. v. Shell Oil Co., 626 F.2d 549, 558 (7th Cir.
1980)).
162. 889 F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1989)
163. Id. at 528 (quoting Valley Liquors/, 822 F.2d 656, 666 (7th Cir. 1982); citing
Military Services Realty, 823 F.2d at 832; Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire
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It is hard to know what to make of these decisions. The Seventh
Circuit in Wilk acknowledged Indiana Federation of Dentists, but
seemed to try to avoid, rather than accept, the Supreme Court's views on
a market power requirement. Additionally, later Seventh Circuit cases
and the Fourth Circuit have required plaintiffs to show market power
without even making any attempt to explain how such a requirement can
be reconciled with the Supreme Court's views. One hopes that if a
plaintiff made a satisfactory showing of anticompetitive effects without
first providing independent proof of market power, these courts would
accept that showing as meeting the plaintiffs initial burden, but their
words suggest otherwise.

B.

Circuits that Have Adopted but Abandoned a
Market Power Requirement

The Eighth Circuit, and probably the Sixth Circuit, also at one time
adopted market power requirements. As described briefly above, 164 the
Eighth Circuit became the first court of appeals to clearly and
unequivocally adopt a threshold market power requirement in Assam
165
Drug Co. v. Miller Brewing Co. The Sixth Circuit has been somewhat
less clear, but in Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise, 166 the court
upheld a jury instruction that apparently required the jury to find that the
defendant had "substantial market power." 167 The appeals court
introduced some ambiguity in stating that "[t]he district court ...
properly instructed the jury to consider [the defendant's] market
power," 168 but the court later indicated, though again with some lack of
clarity, that a showing of market power is required. 169
Corp., 483 F. Supp. 750, 761 (D. Md. 1980), ajf'd, 638 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1981)); see
supra text accompanying notes I 00-04.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 138-40.
165. 798 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1986). The court was explicit:
The market power approach is a proper method of evaluating vertical
nonprice restraints under the rule of reason and is an appropriate basis for
summary judgment in such a case. If [the defendant] lacks market power, the
territorial restraints it imposed on [its distributor] cannot have an
anticompetitive effect on interbrand competition. We agree with the district
court that [the plaintiff] has raised no genuine issue of material fact to deter the
conclusion that [the defendant] lacks market power. Accordingly, we affirm
the summary judgment.
Id. at 319 (footnote omitted). Note that Assam Drug required a showing of market
power only in rule of reason challenges to vertical nonprice restraints.
166. 686 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir. 1982).
167. Id. at 1202.
168. Id. (emphasis added).
169. See Hand v. Central Transport, Inc., 779 F.2d 8, II (6th Cir. 1985) (citing
Davis-Watkins, 686 F.2d at 1202). The ambiguity arose from the court's statement that
"[a] defendant must have market power before its conduct can be shown to have an
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Both courts explicitly abandoned their market power requirements
following Indiana Federation of Dentists."0 The Sixth Circuit recently
went even further, in two respects, in Re/Max International, Inc. v.
171
Realty One, Inc.
First, it stated that after Indiana Federation of
Dentists, a plaintiff in a rule of reason case was neither required to prove
market power nor define a relevant market. 172 Second, Re/Max adopted a
monopoly power rule for section 2 similar to the section 1 market power
rule from Indiana Federation of Dentists, stating that a plaintiff that
shows the actual anticompetitive effects of monopoly power need not
provide independent proof of monopoly power. 173 This approach seems
directly contrary to the Supreme Court's test for monopolization set out
114
in Grinnell.
Putting aside this section 2 holding, the patterns of decision in the
Eighth and Sixth Circuits are exactly what one would expect from courts
that adopted market power requirements. One could wish that the courts
had engaged in more careful analysis in initially adopting the
requirement,1" but each quickly recognized and conformed to the

adverse effect on competition," Hand, 779 F.2d at 11, which falls slightly short of
explicitly requiring the plaintiff to make an independent showing of market power.
170. See Flegel v. Christian Hosp., Northeast-Northwest, 4 F.3d 682, 688 (8th Cir.
1993); Lie v. St. Joseph Hosp., 964 F.2d 567,570 (6th Cir. 1992).
171. 173 F.3d 995 (6th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3138 (Aug.
17, 1999)(No. 99-294).
172. See id. at 1014.
173. See id. at 1018 ("We agree that an antitrust plaintiff is not required to rely on
indirect evidence of a defendant's monopoly power, such as high market share within a
defined market, when there is direct evidence that the defendant has actually set prices or
excluded competition."); see also supra text accompanying notes 44-55.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
175. See, e.g., Assam Drug Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 798 F.2d 311, 315-16 (8th
Cir. 1986) (relying on the purely theoretical point that without power no anticompetitive
effect is possible and on its claim that "[s)ome courts" had previously adopted such a
requirement); see also infra text accompanying notes 242-43. Of the cases that the
Assam Drug court cited, however, none clearly did adopt the requirement. It cited cases
already discussed in this Article: General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing
Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 596 (7th Cir. 1984); Graphic Products Distributors, Inc. v. Itek
Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1570 (I Ith Cir. 1983); Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise,
686 F.2d 1190, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982); Valley Liquors I, 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir.
1982); and Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292, 298 (5th Cir. 1981). The
decision also cited Rothery Storage & Van. Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210,
212 (D.C. Cir. 1986) and O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1274, 1291
(C.D. Cal. 1985), ajf'd, 792 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming the lower court's
decision, but declining to adopt the requirement). For additional discussion, see infra
Part IV.E.
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176

rejection of it by the Supreme Court. The section 2 holding of Re/Max
probably goes too far, however; in that regard, it is consistent with the
loose reasoning of other courts in the market power context. As
177
described above,
the section 2 context of unilateral conduct is
significantly different from the section I context. It is inappropriate to
casually extend a rule forgoing a showing of market power from section
1 to section 2, just as it is inappropriate to extend a rule requiring it from
section 2 to section 1.
C.

Circuits that Have Almost Adopted a Market Power Requirement

Four of the circuits that are often cited as having adopted a market
power requirement never quite did so explicitly. The Fifth Circuit's
178
decision in Muenster Butane is discussed above, and is interestingly
similar to D.C. Circuit and Tenth Circuit cases that are frequently cited
as supporting a market power requirement. Like Muenster Butane, both
the D.C. Circuit opinion, Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines,
Inc.,"' and the Tenth Circuit opinion, SCFC /LC, Inc. v. VISA USA,
Inc. ,1•0 devoted much discussion to how challenged restraints enhanced
1
efficiency by eliminating free riding. " As in Muenster Butane, both
circuit courts suggested that a market power requirement would be a
good idea but did not adopt one. Recall that Muenster Butane held that
such a re~uirement would have "saved the litigants and the courts much
82
expense." Similarly, the Rothery court said that its decision in favor of
the defendant "might well rest, therefore, upon the absence of market
183
184
power," but it did not rest on that absence.
SCFC said that "many
courts" had imposed a market power requirement, while only citing
Valley Liquors //. 185 Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit observed that this
186
approach had become "helpful," but it did not explicitly adopt this
approach for itself, despite concluding that the evidence of market power

176. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 116-21.
179. 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
180. 36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994).
181. See Rothery, 792 F.2d at 221-23; SCFC, 36 F.3d at 969-72. The further
examination in SCFC is consistent with the court's statement that "whether a firm
possesses market power may facilitate the determination that the practice harms
competition and not simply a single competitor." Id. at 965 (emphasis added).
182. Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292,298 (5th Cir. 1981).
183. Rothery, 792 F.2d at 221.
184. See id.
185. SCFC, 36 F.3d at 965.
186. Id.
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was insufficient as a matter of law. 187
In the Eleventh Circuit, uncertainty developed from a somewhat
different source.
An Eleventh Circuit case, Graphic Products
Distributors, Inc. v. Itek Corp.,1 88 is also cited often in support of a
market power requirement. Graphic Products interpreted Muenster
Butane to have "insist[ed], at the threshold" on a showing of market
1
power in a vertical case. " Because Muenster Butane was a pre-Fifth
Circuit-split case, Graphic Products treated such a showing as required
in the Eleventh Circuit, post-split, as well. But the Graphic Products
court concluded that the plaintiff had met its burden of showing market
power,1'° so Graphic Products is not an instance of a dismissal for
failure to show market power. Moreover, th_e only subsequent Eleventh
Circuit case to cite Graphic Products for the market power issue is
191
unclear. An even later Eleventh Circuit case treated the market power
issue as unresolved. 192
The equivocal nature of these decisions has not gone entirely
unnoticed. 193 The interesting question, though, is why they have so often
187. See id. at 969.
188. 7!7F.2d !560(llthCir. 1983).
189. Id. at 1568; see id. at 1568-69 (citing Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co.,
651 F.2d 292,298 (5th Cir. 1981)).
190. See id. at 1571.
191. See L.A. Draper & Son v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 735 F.2d 414 (I Ith Cir.
1984). The L.A. Draper court said that '"[a]n antitrust plaintiff ... makes out a prima
facie case under the rule of reason only upon proof of a well-defined relevant market
upon which the challenged anticompetitive actions would have substantial impact."' Id.
at 422 (quoting Dougherty v. Continental Oil Co., 579 F.Zd 954, 962 (5th Cir. 1978),
vacated by stipulation of the parties, 591 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1979)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). This statement suggests only that market definition, not proof of market
power, is necessary.
192. See National Bancard Corp. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir.
1986). The Eleventh Circuit said that "[ w]hether the court, in applying the rule of
reason, must weigh the market power of the antitrust defendant is a curiously confused
and uncertain area of the law." Id. at 603. It also said that "[c]ases can be cited for both
sides of the proposition," but cited neither Graphic Products nor L.A. Draper. Id.
193. See K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 129
(2d Cir. 1995) (describing Rothery as "suggesting that a showing of market power is a
strict prerequisite to recovery in all [section] 1 cases"); see also SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA
USA, 36 F.3d 958, 970 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that in Rothery, "the D.C. Circuit
rejected plaintiffs' claim, based not simply on the evidence [the defendant] did not
possess market power ... but also on the conclusion the new rule ... enhanc[ed]
consumer welfare by creating efficiency"); R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v.
Thermogenics, Inc., 890 F.2d 139, 164 (9th Cir. 1989) (Thompson, J., dissenting)
(describing Rothery as relying on absence of market power in rejecting section 1 claim
under rule of reason analysis, but not including it among cases that require a showing of
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been cited as having required a showing of market power when they did
not in fact do so, or at least did not do so clearly. This question is even
more interesting in light of the fact that, as with the Eleventh Circuit,
none of the others has reaffirmed its purported imposition of a market
power requirement. Although most of the post-Muenster Butane cases
in the Fifth Circuit have emphasized the importance of interbrand
competition, 194 only one of them seems to require that the plaintiff show
market power, and that one does so only by what is probably
typographical error."' Despite frequent citations to Rothery elsewhere,
the D.C. Circuit apparently has not subsequently cited it in support of a
market power requirement. The issue apparently has not yet arisen again
in the Tenth Circuit since the 1994 SCFC decision.
Whether these circuits will recognize the Supreme Court's rejection of
a market power requirement is not certain, except in the Eleventh
Circuit, which has done so. 196 The Fifth Circuit has not discussed the
implications of Indiana Federation of Dentists, but since, as discussed
above, the Fifth Circuit may not itself have been committed to a market
power requirement, it may be that no alteration in its views is required.
market power).
194. See, e.g., Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001,
1005 (5th Cir. 1981); Daniels v. All Steel Equip., Inc., 590 F.2d Ill, 113-14 (5th Cir.
1979). Red Diamond almost says that proof of less intrabrand competition is not enough.
See Red Diamond, 637 F.2d at 1005. This could be read to require that a plaintiff also
prove a reduction in interbrand competition, which in tum might be read to require that a
plaintiff prove an increase in market power. However, a later case, Mendelovitz v.
Adolph Coors Co., 693 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1982), says that proof of injury to intrabrand
competition alone, in limited circumstances, is enough to meet the plaintiff's initial
burden. See id. at 57 5.
195. See Hornsby Oil Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 714 F.2d 1384 (5th Cir.
1983). The Hornsby court cited Muenster Butane in support of the statement that
"[a]bsent proof of a diminution [sic] in interbrand market power [sic]... a
manufacturer's termination of a single distributor does not contravene the antitrust laws."
ld. at 1394. The court must either have meant to say "a diminution in interbrand
competition" or "an increase in interbrand market power." Judging from the context of
the statement, where the same paragraph referred to "[al reduction in intrabrand
competition," id., the court probably meant to refer to a "diminution in interbrand
competition." If so, that would leave open the possibility that a plaintiff could prove the
reduction in interbrand competition without directly proving market power.
Alternatively, the court might have meant to refer to "an increase in interbrand market
power," in which it would have required proof of market power. But such a statement
would go even farther than other statements of the market power requirement, in that it
would presumably require proof of an increase in market power.
196. See Levine v. Central Florida Med. Affiliates, Inc., 72 F.3d 1538 (I Ith Cir.
1996). The Levine court took notice of Indiana Federation of Dentists in stating that
"[i]n order to prove an anticompetitive effect on the market, the plaintiff may either
prove that the defendants' behavior had an 'actual detrimental effect' on competition, or
that the behavior had 'the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition.'" Id. at
1551 (quoting FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986)). It is
only if the plaintiff chooses to prove the latter that it must prove market power. See id.
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The Tenth Circuit's decision in SCFC is more recent than Indiana
Federation of Dentists, so even if it is not clear that it required market
power, it appears to be more sympathetic to such a requirement than one
would expect. Finally, although the D.C. Circuit in Superior Court Trial
91
Lawyers Ass'n v. FTC' noted that there would have been no need for a
showing of market power if "there were no countervailing
procompetitive justifications for [a] facially anticompetitive boycott,"'"
the elimination of the market power requirement for facially competitive
practices is only one aspect of NCAA and Indiana Federation of
Dentists.'"' The other aspect is the elimination of the requirement when
the plaintiff shows actual anticompetitive effects; the D.C. Circuit did
not mention that possibility, making unclear how it would treat such a
· 200
sh owmg.
D. Circuits that Have Experimented with a Market Power Requirement

Courts in both the First and Ninth Circuits initially seemed to adopt
197. 856 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev"d in pan. 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
198. Id. at 249.
199. See Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460-61; NCAA v. Board of
Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109-10 (1984).
200. The D.C. Circuit apparently favors a market power requirement in certain
circumstances. In Superior Coan Trial Lawyers, it relied on the peculiar nature of the
boycott in imposing such a requirement, holding "that the evidentiary shortcut to
antitrust condemnation without proof of market power is inappropriate as applied to a
boycott that served, in part, to make a statement on a matter of public debate." Superior
Coun Trial Lawyers, 856 F.2d at 250. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
challenged boycott was per se illegal. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n,
493 U.S. 411,436 (1990).
Interestingly, in the same year the Supreme Court somewhat similarly reversed an
Eleventh Circuit decision, Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 874 F.2d 1417 (11th Cir.
1990), rev'd, 498 U.S. 46 (1990). In that decision, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a
district court decision that had rejected the plaintiffs' effort to meet their burden through
proof that the defendants' agreement had caused actual anticompetitive effects, by
introducing evidence of a "dramatic price increase" following the challenged agreement.
Id. at 1437 (Clark, J., dissenting). The dissent objected, pointing out that under Indiana
Federation of Dentists, the plaintiffs were permitted to show actual detrimental effects,
and did not have to provide a detailed market analysis. See id. at 1436-37 n.26 (Clark, J.,
dissenting). Again, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the challenged restraint
was per se illegal. See Palmer, 498 U.S. at 50.
Of course, the question of whether the per se rule or the rule of reason is applicable is
not the same question as whether a showing of market power is required under the rule
of reason. So, although it is not clear whether the Court's reversals in these decisions
have broader implications for a requirement of market power, they certainly do not
suggest that the Court is willing to expand the role of market power.
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market power requirements when other courts were doing so, but both
circuits later apparently abandoned the requirement. 201 The relevant First
202
Circuit case was CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., which said that "[i]n order
to prove a contract or combination in restraint of trade in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff must . . . prove that the
defendant had market power in the relevant market, and the specific
intent to restrain competition." 203 The relevant case from the Ninth
Circuit was a California district court case, O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple
Computer, Inc., 204 which said that "[a]bsent significant market power, a
vertical restriction is reasonable as a matter of law."205 Although this
statement falls somewhat short of requiring the plaintiff to prove market
power in that it does not clearly place the burden of proof on the
plaintiff, the court probably intended to impose a market power
•
206
reqmrement.
These two cases and their later treatment share interesting similarities.
First, each court's statement came in a context that made it less than
compelling. In CYD, the problem was that in the same sentence that it
required a showing of market power, the court also said that section 1
requires a specific intent to restrain competition,'0' which is clearly
201. The same could perhaps be said of the Fifth Circuit. See supra text
accompanying notes 194-95.
202. 769 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1985). Courts and commentators have incorrectly said
that other First Circuit cases adopted a market power requirement. Professor Posner in
his 1981 article cited George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc., v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508
F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1974), as having adopted a market power requirement when it did not.
See supra text accompanying notes 91-93. O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 601 F.
Supp. 1274 (C.D. Cal. 1985), affd, 792 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1986), cited Bruce Drug,
Inc. v. Hollister, Inc., 688 F.2d 853 (1st Cir. 1982), as having adopted such a
requirement when it did not. Bruce Drug said that the defendant's actions "ha[d] the
overall effect of promoting vigorous interbrand competition," so that the court "[was]
unable to find that [the defendant's] conduct diminishe[d] intrabrand competition
without producing significant benefits for interbrand competition." Bruce Drug, 688
F.2d at 860.
203. CVD, 769 F.2d at 851.
204. 601 F. Supp. 1274 (C.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 792 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1986).
205. Id. at 1291 n.8 (citing Bruce Drug, 688 F.2d at 859-60; Davis-Watkins Co. v.
Service Merchandise, 686 F.2d 1190, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982); Muenster Butane, Inc. v.
Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292, 298 (5th Cir. 1981)).
206. See Assam Drug Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 798 F.2d 311, 315-16 (8th Cir.
I986) (citing O.S. C. Corp. as among the courts that "have narrowed the unlimited
inquiry necessary under the rule of reason by requiring at the threshold that the plaintiff
attacking a vertical nonprice restraint prove the defendant's substantial market power in
a relevant market"). Even the Ninth Circuit cites it as having adopted the requirement.
See R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 827 F.2d 407, 1987 U.S. App.
LEXIS 11681, at *19-20 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 1987) (citing O.S.C. Corp. as one of the
courts requiring that "[i]n the first step, the claimant must demonstrate that the
conspirators had significant market power''), opinion on rehearing en bane, 890 F.2d
I 39 (9th Cir. I989).
207. See CVD, 769 F.2d at 851.

34

[VOL 37: I, 2000]

The Market Power Requirement
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

incorrect. This casts doubt on the court's care in making the statement.
One explanation is that CVD involved primarily a claim of attempted
monopolization, 208 for which specific intent is required.",. Thus, the
court may have been confusing the requirements for the two claims. 210
Similarly, O.S.C. was also speaking outside the context of the rule of
reason. Because the case apparently presented only a per se claim211 and
its imposition of a market power requirement appeared in a footnote, the
court was apparently only indulging a desire to expound upon the
antitrust merits of the case.
Second, the statements of both courts were ignored by later court of
appeals cases. First Circuit cases after CVD have neither required a
showing of market power nor referred to CVD's apparent imposition of
212
such a requirement.
A few district courts in the First Circuit have
adopted a market power requirement, but with one exception, even they
213
have not cited CVD in support of it. For example, Winter Hill Frozen
214
Foods & Services, Inc. v. Haagen-Dazs Co. said that "[w]here there
are vertical nonprice restraints, some circuits have ruled that a threshold
inquiry in rule of reason analysis is whether the defendant has market
208. The case alleged a bad-faith assertion of trade secrets, and the court primarily
cited other cases under section 2 that alleged bad-faith assertions of intellectual property.
See id. at 849 (citing Walker Process Equip. Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382
U.S. 172, 177-78 (1965); Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1979);
Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952)).
209. See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447,456 (1993).
210. Moreover, the court found that the defendant did in fact have market power, so
the court's comments on market power were not necessary to its decision. See CVD, 769
F.2d at 851.
211. See O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1274, 1291 n.8 (C.D.
Cal. 1985), ajf'd, 792 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting that the plaintiff had not pleaded
anticompetitive effect).
212. See Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Found., Inc., 152 F.3d 48 (1st Cir.
1998); Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994); Monahan's Marine, Inc., v. Boston
Whaler, Inc., 866 F.2d 525 (1st Cir. 1989).
213. The exception, Norte Car Corp. v. Firstbank Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.P.R.
1998), cites CVD in support of imposing a market power requirement. See Norte Car, 25
F. Supp. 2d at 21. But in Norte Car, the plaintiff had not even pied market power, and
the court dismissed the case without prejudice, with leave to replead. See id. at 21.
Another district court case, Shepherd Intelligence Systems, Inc. v. Defense
Technologies, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 365 (D. Mass. 1988), may also assume that proof of
market power is required, though it refers only to a pleading requirement. In Shepherd,
the court said that "[t]he defendants also argue that Shepherd has failed to plead
substantial market power in the relevant market as required by sec[tion] 1 or a dangerous
probability of success in monopolizing the relevant market as required by sec[tion] 2."
Id. at 369 (citing CVD, 769 F.2d at 851).
214. 691 F. Supp. 539 (D. Mass. 1988).
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power. " 21 ' However, it cited only Assam Drug from the Eighth Circuit
and Hennessy Industries, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 216 from the Seventh
21
Circuit. ' Subsequent district court cases in the First Circuit either
mention but do not apply a market power requirement,'1' refer to a need
to consider market power but do not make it a requirement,219 or impose
such a requirement without citing CVD or any other First Circuit case. 220
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the O.S.C. holding, 221 but did not repeat the
district court's market power observations. The Ninth Circuit instead
noted that "[t]he evidence showed that competition was intense before
and increased after the [challenged restraint] was adopted. "222 This
appears to be an assessment of anticompetitive effect. Moreover, later
Ninth Circuit cases do not treat the market power requirement as
established in the circuit. Although one Ninth Circuit case did state that
ordinarily the existence of market power is an essential ingredient in a
rule of reason case,"' another case observed that "[o]ur court has not
adopted a specific test for demonstrating in section [ 1] cases that a
conspiracy has had a substantial anticompetitive effect. "224 More recent
cases have made clear that no showing of market power is required after

215. Id. at 547.
216. 779 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1985).
217. See Haagen Dazs, 691 F. Supp. at 547 (citing Assam Drug Co. v. Miller
Brewing Co. 798 F.2d 311, 315-16 (8th Cir. 1986); Hennessy Indus., 779 F.2d at
404-05).
218. See Healthco lnt'l, Inc. v. A-dee, Inc., 1989 WL 104064, at *3, 4-6 (D. Mass.
Apr. 17, 1989).
219. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 1992 WL 59713, at *5-8
(D.N.H. Jan. 30, 1992), ajf'd, U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589
(1st Cir. 1993).
220. See Holmes Prods. Corp. v. Dana Lighting, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 27, 32 (D. Mass.
1997) (stating that "a vertical restraint would, absent market power on defendant's part,
be perfectly legal," but citing only Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S.
36, 54-55 (1977), and Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961), in
support of that statement); see also Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Found., Inc., 888
F. Supp. 274, 283 (D. Mass. 1995) (stating that "[a]n essential element of every rule of
reason claim is a showing that the defendants exercised market power in some relevant
market," but citing no cases in support of that statement); AT&T Co. v. IMR Capital
Corp., 888 F. Supp. 221, 252 (D. Mass. 1995) (stating that "[a]s a preliminary matter, ...
the plaintiff in such a [rule of reason] case must first demonstrate that the defendant is
capable of causing antitrust harm by showing that it (the defendant) can exercise 'market
power' in the relevant market," and citing tying cases from the First Circuit, a Seventh
Circuit case, Sanjuan v. American Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247,251
(7th Cir. 1994), and district court cases).
221. O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 792 F.2d 1464, 1470 (9th Cir. 1986).
222. Id. at 1469.
223. See Hahn v. Oregon Physicians' Serv., 868 F.2d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 1988).
224. R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 827 F.2d 407, 1987 U.S.
App. LEXIS 11681, at *19 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 1987), opinion on rehearing en bane, 890
F.2d 139 (9th Cir. 1989).
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Indiana Federation of Dentists. 225
The explanations for these two short-lived adoptions of a market
power requirement appear to be very different. In CVD, the explanation
seems simply to have been carelessness: the court cited no support for its
imposition of the requirement and it did not play an important role in the
226
case.
In O.S.C., the explanation appears to have been exactly the
opposite. Despite the fact that market power was not at issue, because
the plaintiff was apparently pursuing a per se price-fixing case,221 the
court took the opportunity to write a 1300-word footnote on the role of
market power under the rule of reason. The court seems to have gotten
caught up in the early market power rhetoric, in that it cites many of the
early cases. 22' As noted above, although the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court, it did not affirm on the market power issue. 229
E.

Circuits that Have Never Adopted a Market Power Requirement

As described above, although Judge Posner claimed the Second
Circuit to have imposed a market power requirement in Oreck, that
opinion in fact better supports the opposite position.230 Recently, in
K.M.B. Warehouse Distributors, Inc. v. Walker Manufacturing Co.,2 31 the
Second Circuit made its position quite clear: "This court has not made a
showing of market power a prerequisite for recovery in all [section] 1
cases. If a plaintiff can show an actual adverse effect on competition,
such as reduced output, we do not require a further showing of market
power."2' 2 The Third Circuit's approach has been similar. Early on, in
233
Harold Friedman Inc. v. Thorofare Markets lnc., the Third Circuit said
225. See, e.g., Nestle Food Co. v. Abbott Lab., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 494, at *7
(9th Cir. Jan. 9, 1997); Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1413 (9th Cir. 1991).
226. See CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842, 851 (1st Cir. 1985). The claim
at issue was one by former employees of a corporation that the corporation had asserted
trade secrets in bad faith, and the court focused on the trade secret issues. See id. at 84748. The court resolved the market power issue in one sentence noting that the jury's
finding of market power was "amply supported by the evidence." Id. at 851.
227. See O.S.C., 601 F. Supp. at 1292. The court noted that the plaintiff had not
pied anticompetitive effect. See id. at 1291 n.8.
228. See id.
229. See supra note 175.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 76-80.
231. 61 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1995).
232. Id. at 129 (citation omitted) (citing FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S.
447, 460-61 (1986); Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d
537,546 (2d Cir. 1993)).
233. 587 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1978).
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of the factors on which the rule of reason turns that "no single aspect is
234
dispositive."
It has held this view consistentlt' 235 Recently, it
reaffirmed it in United States v. Brown University, 23 where it said that
"[t]he rule of reason requires the fact-finder to 'weigh[] all of the
circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should
be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition,"~37
and that "[t]he plaintiff may satisfy [its] burden by proving the existence
of actual anticompetitive effects." 238
In addition, Brown University offered an interesting approach to the
market power issue, observing that because proof of actual effects is not
always possible, "courts typically allow proof of the defendant's 'market
power' instead.""' This appears to present market power as a
permissive, rather than restrictive, element. That is, it seems to view the
preferred approach under the rule of reason as that of proving actual
anticompetitive effect. When that is not possible, the court will "allow"
proof of market power, which is presumably intended to show when
there is a potential of anticompetitive effects. In this way, market power
substitutes for proof of anticompetitive effect, which the court assumes
cannot be shown. This seems close to the Supreme Court's treatment of
market power in its per se cases 240 and to Philadelphia National Bank's
241
presumption of anticompetitive effect from market share.
It is an
approach almost opposite that of a threshold market power requirement.
V.

THE THEORETICAL VALIDITY OF THE MARKET
POWER REQUIREMENT

This Article's purpose is not to argue that a market power requirement
is inappropriate; such a requirement might indeed be appropriate, at least
in some cases. The purpose instead is simply to point out that the case
for the requirement has not been made. The previous sections showed

234. Id. at 143.
235. See, e.g., Fineman v. Annstrong World Indus. Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 202 (3d Cir.
1992) (observing that Indiana Federation of Dentists said that market power need not be
shown where there is "a naked restriction on price or output without a competitive
justification" or where the plaintiff provides "'proof of actual detrimental effects"')
(quoting Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at460-61).
236. 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
237. Id. at 668 (second alteration in original) (quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977)).
238. Id. (citing Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460-61; Tunis Bros. Co. v.
Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 728 (3d Cir. 1992)).
239. Id. (citing NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 110 (1984); Tunis Bros.,
952 F.2d at 727).
240. See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.

38

[VOL. 37: I, 2000]

The Market Power Requirement
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

that the Supreme Court has never adopted a market power requirement
and that the lower courts have done so on shaky foundations. This
section offers a brief discussion of the theoretical justifications that have
been offered for the market power requirement.
The justification most commonly offered for a market power
requirement is that a seller without market power cannot impose
anticompetitive terms. 242 This falls far short of justifying a requirement
that a plaintiff prove market power. The question is not whether the
defendant must have market power, but whether it makes antitrust
litigation more accurate and efficient to require that the plaintiff prove
that the defendant has market power. Given the difficulties of proving
market power and even of defining a market,"' it is not clear that the
interests of litigation are best served by requiring a showing of market
power. It might well be more accurate and efficient to allow plaintiffs to
show anticompetitive effect directly.
To make the case for a market power requirement, it must be shown
that proof of market power is more accurate or efficient than proof of
anticompetitive effect. Judge Easterbrook has made the most prominent,
and perhaps the o~, effort in this direction. In his 1984 article The
Limits of Antitrust, then-Professor Easterbrook advocated the use of a
series of "filters," most prominent among them market power,"' in
antitrust cases. 246 He argued that it is difficult for judges to decide the
ultimate antitrust question-whether a business practice is
procompetitive or anticompetitive-so that filters are desirable in order
247
to screen out weak antitrust claims.
Rather startlingly, Easterbrook
says that the issue of competitive effect is difficult to decide because
antitrust defendants are unable to explain why their actions are
procompetitive: "[E]ntrepreneurs often flounder from one practice to
another trying to find one that works. When they do, they may not know
why it works, whether because of efficiency or exclusion.""'
242. See supra text accompanying note 2.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
244. See generally Easterbrook, supra note 2, at I.
245. Market power is most prominent in the article, where it is the first of five
filters Easterbrook describes. See id. at 19-23.
246. See id. at 17-39.
247. Others have challenged this claim, arguing that the factual inquiry in antitrust
cases is not inherently more difficult than those in other complex cases. See Richard S.
Markovits, The Limits to Simplifying Antitrust: A Reply to Professor Easterbrook, 63
Tux. L. REV. 41, 69 (1984).
248. Frank H. Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME
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Easterbrook' s view that businesspeople may not understand or be able
to explain their actions is not supported by the business literature.
Businesspeople pay a lot of money to business schools and consultants
in order to be told what to do, and why it will work. That does not
establish, of course, that any individual businessperson knows whether
his or her business practices are efficient or exclusionary. But given the
broad dissemination of business strategy information, it does mean that
it is unwise to casually assert that businesspeople routinely are
"floundering."
In any event, the real question is whether Easterbrook's filters-and
more particularly the market power filter, which has been widely
adopted by courts-do a good job of distinguishing practices that are
likely to be anticompetitive from those that are likely to be
procompetitive. Or, to put the question in the form in which courts
adopting a market power requirement typically put it, is the existence vel
non of market power a good means of determining whether a particular
practice can be anticompetitive? Even if individual businesspeople
might not be able to answer this question, business consultants probably
can. After all, business professors and consultants, unlike judges,249 are
presumably selected for their ability to evaluate the likely success of
business practices.
To examine how business professionals view the significance of
market power, the paragraphs below discuss two works of Michael
Porter. 250 Porter is a logical choice, because he is perhaps the most
prominent writer on business practices, and is also one whose advice has
been recognized as relevant to antitrust issues. 251 Porter describes five
L. REV. 972. 975 (1986). This Article's research uncovered only one article in which
this claim is addressed.
See Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Predation,
"Rationality." and Judicial Somnambulance, 64 U. CIN. L. REv. 811 (1996). Professors
Adams and Brock point out that the claim is inconsistent with Easterbrook's contentions
elsewhere that potential victims of predatory-pricing strategies have sophisticated
responses for defeating those strategies. See id. at 860 n.238 (citing Frank H.
Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 26971 ( 1981)). Adams and Brock do not, however, discuss the importance of the claim for
Easterbrook's "filtering" approach more generally.
249. Cf Frank H. Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 GEO.
L.J. 305, 306 (1987) ("After all, judges are not selected for business acumen and are not
penalized for bad decisions.").
250. See MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: CREATING AND
SUSTAINING SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE (1985) [hereinafter PORTER, ADVANTAGE];
MICHAELE. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING INDUSTRIES
AND COMPETITORS (1980) [hereinafter PORTER, STRATEGY].
251. See Innovation, Rivalry, and Competitive Advantage: Interview with Professor
Michael E. Porter, ANTITRUST, Spring 1991, at 5, 5 ("Professor Michael Porter has been
a leading scholar and author concerning business strategy for years.") (Editor's Note)
[hereinafter Innovation and Rivalry]; Robert Prentice, Vaporware: Imaginary High-Tech
Products and Real Antitrust Liability in a Post-Chicago World, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1163,
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forces that "determine[] the ultimate profit potential in [an] industry""':
rivalry among existing firms, the threat of new entrants, the threat of
substitute products or services, the bargaining power of buyers, and the
bargaining power of suppliers."' This section focuses on the first two of
these.
In Porter's view, rivalry is the central component of competition. 254
The importance of rivalry in antitrust is also recognized by Chicago
School antitrust scholars, if only implicitly."' For example, Easterbrook
relies on rivalry in the following passage justifying the use of a market
power screen:
Firms that lack power cannot injure competition no matter how hatd they try.
They may injure a few consumers, or a few rivals, or themselves . . . by
selecting "anticompetitive" tactics. When the firms lack matket power, though,
they cannot persist in deleterious practices. Rival firms will offer the
consumers better deals. 256

Thus, Easterbrook's view is that rivalry always steps in to eliminate
inefficient practices.
Porter's view is different. Rivalry is important in Porter's analysis
because it describes the vigor with which competitors try to take away
each other's business. In Porter's view, "good" competitors play by the
"rules of [the game],""' allowing all to profit."'
Under these
circumstances, competitors do not need market power in order to impose
supracompetitive terms."' That is, whereas Easterbrook assumes-as
does Posner-that when a seller without market power imposes
anticompetitive terms on its customers, the seller's competitors will
1195 n.149 (1996) (describing Porter as "[t]he most prominent business strategist").
252. PORTER, STRATEGY, supra note 250, at 3.
253. See id. at 3-6.
254. See id. at 4-6.
255. Some such scholats make statements that could be interpreted to mean that
rivalry is not important. For exatnple, Easterbrook has said that "[a] 'competitive
matket' is not necessarily the one with the most rivalry moment-to-moment."
Easterbrook, supra note 2, at I; see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A
POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 58 (1978) ("[The] identification of competition with rivalry
will not do for antitrust purposes. It makes rivalry an end in and of itself, no matter how
many or how latge the benefits flowing from the elimination of rivalry."). It is surely
correct that some level of cooperation among competitors will often provide efficiencies,
but it is not this sort of elimination of rivalry that Porter has in mind.
256. Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 20.
257. PORTER, ADVANTAGE, supra note 250, at 213.
258. See id. at 212-18.
259. Alternatively, one could view the sort of implicit cooperation required lo
eliminate rivalry as a source of matket power.
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offer the customers better deals, Porter believes that the competitors may
instead choose to go along, allowing all of them to profit.
Possible instances of such parallel anticompetitive behavior in
antitrust are not difficult to find. Easterbrook, in fact, chooses one as an
example of how the courts go wrong. In Standard Oil Co. v. United
260
States (Standard Stations), the government challenged the exclusive
dealing arrangements that Standard Oil had with its dealers. Standard
Oil had only a sixteen percent share of the market, 261 and therefore did
not have market power. For that reason, Easterbrook lists Standard
Stations as a case that "is easy to knock out ... at the threshold."262 But
the Court observed that Standard Oil's competitors also used similar
exclusive dealing arrangements.263 Easterbrook would argue that this
parallel behavior indicates that the practice was efficient, else one or
more of the competitors would deviate from it and profit. From Porter's
expert business perspective, though, it might instead be the case that all
of the oil companies were "good" competitors playing by the "rules of
[the game]. " 264 That is, perhaps all of the oil companies do better if they
all resist any efforts of gasoline dealers to play one oil company off
against another.
There are other variations on the rivalry question. For instance, the
market might not be one like that in Standard Stations, with a number of
sellers of roughly equal size, but might instead have one dominant firm
and a number of smaller competitors. In this context, Porter discusses
the effect of "good" market leaders. A "good" leader "with high returnon-investment goals, concern for the 'health of the industry,' a strategy
built upon differentiation, and a disinclination to serve certain industry
segments due to mixed motives will offer opportunities for followers to
earn attractive returns in a relatively stable industry environment." 265
That is, even small competitors in industries dominated by a "good"
market leader can-at least if they are in segments that the leader is
disinclined to serve --earn supracompetitive returns.
The point here, of course, is not that vigorous rivalry does not exist.
The point is that there is no way to evaluate the significance of market
power without knowing about the conditions of rivalry in the industry.
If rivalry is absent or weak, a small market share may not prevent a
seller from imposing anticompetitive terms. And even where rivalry
appears to exist, as when sellers compete with each other using different
260.
26 I.
262.
263.
264.
265.
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sales practices, appearances may be misleading: a recent article showed
that two sellers can each earn supracompetitive profits if one imposes
tying arrangements with its sales and the other does not. 266 Thus, a
single-minded focus on market power can be unhelpful and perhaps
misleading.
Another perspective from which to look at the business expert's view
of market power is from the view of an individual seller seeking to gain
a competitive advantage. 267 As Andrew Rosenfield268 pointed out in a
presentation at the 1998 American Bar Association Section of Antitrust
Law's Spring Meeting, Porter encourages sellers following his advice to
behave anticompetitively. He does so in his discussion of "defensive
strategy ," 269 which includes "raisin~ barriers to entry and mobility to
make a challen~e more difficult."" Barriers to entry are a source of
market power," so a seller that creates such barriers, at least if they
provide no competitive benefits, has behaved anticompetitively.
Moreover, the sorts of activities that Porter advocates in this area are
exactly the sorts of vertical restraints that are often challenged under the
rule of reason: exclusive agreements with dealers and suppliers,"'
bundling (ting), 273 and various sorts of product differentiation, such as
advertising 74 and sales assistance to dealers."'
Porter does not encourage his readers to engage in defensive tactics
indiscriminately, or, as Easterbrook would have it, "randomly." Instead,
he "show[s] how a firm can identify the most effective defensive tactics
in a particular industry." 216 A view of competition focused on market
power would suggest that only sellers with power could engage in
defensive tactics. This is not Porter's view. He says that "[t]he
effectiveness of a defensive tactic is a function of the asymmetry
266. See Yongmin Chen, Equilibrium Product Bundling, 70 J. Bus. 85, 86 (1997).
267. An approach along this line of reasoning is advocated for vertical intrabrand
restraints in Gerhart, supra note 35, at 442-43.
268. Rosenfield was then the president of Lexecon, Inc., the law-and-economics
consulting firm.
269. PORlER, ADVANTAGE, supra note 250, at 482; see id. at 482-512.
270. Id. at 483.
271. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 39 ("For antitrust purposes, a barrier to entry
is some factor in a market that permits firms already in the market to earn monopoly
profits, while deterring outsiders from coming in.").
272. See PORlER, ADVANTAGE, supra note 250, at 489-90, 493.
273. See id. at 425-36.
274. See id. at 500.
275. See id. at 123-24.
276. Id. at 483.
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between the cost of the tactic to the firm and the cost imposed on the
211
challenger."
Sometimes, it is true, a defensive tactic will be less
costly to a firm with more market power; Porter gives the example of
advertising, which is usually relatively less costly to a firm with a larger
market share."' But other practices, such as encouraging or subsidizing
dealers' investments in facilities, 279 may actually be less expensive for
sellers with smaller market shares."0
To be sure, Porter also emphasizes that sellers "should select those
defensive tactics which are valuable to buyers,""' and presumably it is
exactly those practices that are valuable to buyers that would not require
market power to impose. But Porter also makes clear that the value to
the seller of a defensive tactic cannot be measured only by whether the
practice will pay for itself through increased sales, which a practice
valuable to buyers presumably would do. He says that the value of the
practice must also be measured by whether it forces other sellers to
spend more. 282 Thus, one could imagine that a seller might give its
dealers exclusive territories and subsidize their investments in facilities
in order to impose higher costs on other sellers with more dealers."'
Once again, the point of this discussion is not to argue that market
power is irrelevant. Market power, at least in the form of cost
advantages, is relevant even in Porter's analysis. But the analysis must
be a much more careful one than the simple calculation of market share
that is now typical. Instead, it requires an examination of the particular
practice that is challenged and a determination of whether that practice is
less expensive (or at least no more expensive) to the defendant than to
the plaintiff that challenges it. 284 If so, the plaintiffs claim may be
Id. at 500-01.
See id. at 501.
279. See id. at 125. As Porter says, these sorts of practices function in part as
"signals," the factors used by buyers to evaluate a firm's offerings. Id. at 139. Such
factors include "advertising, reputation, packaging, the professionalism, appearance, and
personality of supplier employees, the attractiveness of facilities, and information
provided in sales presentations." Id. Signaling is particularly important because, as
Porter points out, "signaling does not itself create value." Id. at 156. Therefore,
signaling produces no compensating procompetitive effect to balance its possibly
anticompetitive differentiating effect.
280. Imagine, for example, that there are two sellers, one with few dealers and one
with many. If the seller with few dealers subsidized those dealers' investments in fancy
new facilities, the seller with many dealers could find it more expensive to respond in
kind.
281. PORTER, ADVANTAGE, supra note 250, at 500.
282. See id. at 425, 501.
283. See supra note 280.
284. That is, it requires an analysis of whether the defendant is raising its rivals'
costs. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion:
Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 230-48 (1986);
Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law,
277.
278.
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plausible even if the defendant does not possess traditional market
power. And if the claim is plausible, any anticompetitive effects of the
practice must be balanced with any procompetitive effects, as Porter's
analysis suggests"' and the Supreme Court mandates. 286
VI. CONCLUSION

The requirement that an antitrust plaintiff show market power in rule
of reason cases has an uninspiring history and unconvincing
justifications. Such a requirement has never been adopted by the
Supreme Court, and is currently imposed by only the Seventh and
Fourth Circuits. Indeed, the requirement was never imposed very
widely, despite frequent claims to the contrary. More significantly, the
Seventh Circuit cases that initially established the requirement, and that
continue to be cited for it, did so with misleading citations to cases from
other circuits. Furthermore, the justifications that have been offered for
the requirement have generally been either theoretically valid but
unconnected to litigation, or empirically based but both implausible and
unsupported .287
Still, the imposition of a market power requirement responds to valid
concerns about antitrust litigation. Weak cases are brought, and it
would be desirable to dismiss them at an early stage, without the
expense of a full-blown rule of reason analysis. In this respect, the
market power approach's theoretical justification-that cases in which a
defendant cannot injure competition should be dismissed-may have a
role to play. But that role must take into account the variety of contexts
in which the rule of reason is applied; it does not mandate the
indiscriminate application of a single market power test. 288
76 GEO. L.J. 241, 258 (1987).
285. See supra text accompanying note 281.
286. See supra note 19.
287. See supra Part V. Interestingly, some have suggested that the use of market
power as a screen is even less valid in the high technology industries that are the subject
of much of today's antitrust litigation. See Maija Pesola, Are High-Tech Industries
Really Different?, GLOBAL COMP. REV., Apr.-May 1999, at 14, 15 (reporting the views
of private and government antitrust lawyers that market definition and market share
measures are less useful in high technology industries).
288. In this respect, it is worth noting Professor Hovenkamp's observation that in
some circumstances, notably "foreclosure" offenses, "[t]he real 'power' basis of the
offense ... is market share, not market power as such." HovENKAMP, supra note 1, at
82. One might think, because market share is so often used as a proxy for market power,
that this is an unimportant distinction. But the share that is relevant in foreclosure cases
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Some efforts have been made in the direction of a more contextsensitive approach, but one that would still allow the dismissal of weak
antitrust cases. For example, shortly after the Supreme Court's decision
in Sylvania, several commentators proposed approaches that recognized
the "sharp differences in competitive effect among the different
'justifications' for vertical restrictions." 289 These articles, however,
appear to have been swept away by the Valley Liquors I and II-led focus
on market power, and more recent efforts along the same line290 seem to
have had little effect."' Perhaps recognition of the deficiencies in the
development of the market power requirement will serve to encourage a
more discriminating approach to the rule of reason.

is the share of the market foreclosed, not the market share of the defendant. Therefore, a
focus on market power is misdirected.
289. Robert Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical
Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 26 (1978); see id. at 26-37; see also Gerhart, supra
note 35, at 442.
290. See generally Warren S, Grimes, Spiff, Polish, and Consumer Demand
Quality: Vertical Price Restraints Revisited, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 815 (1992); Robert L.
Steiner, How Manufacturers Deal with the Price-Cutting Retailer: When Are Vertical
Restraints Efficient?, 65 ANTI1RUST L.J. 407 (1996).
291. In the European Union, some effort has been made to distinguish formally
among the various sorts of vertical restraints with a proposal to use a dual-market powerthreshold that "allows an economically justified gradation in the treatment of vertical
restraints reflecting differences in their likely anti-competitive effects." Communication
from the Commission on the Application of the Community Competition Rules to
Vertical Restraints (Follow-Up to the Green Paper on Vertical Restraints), 1998 OJ. (C
365) 3, 19.
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